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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. Background 
In 1972, in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
1
 the U.S. Supreme 
Court proclaimed: ―A direction by the legislature to the police to arrest all 
‗suspicious‘ persons would not pass constitutional muster.‖  The Court in 
effect prohibited the federal and state governments from arresting, prose-
cuting, and, most importantly, convicting persons based solely on a status, 
alone or in combination with innocuous conduct, that for historical or other 
reasons conjures government suspicion of possible crime.  The purpose of 
this article is to evaluate whether that ruling, after September 11, 2001, can 
still be fairly characterized as the law of the land.  Criminalization of status 
and innocuous omissions or conduct is criminalization based on subjective 
suspicion, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held multiple times that such 
criminalization violates the national Constitution.
2
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that criminalization of 
one‘s status as a gangster, gang member, ex-felon, or addict violates the 
Constitution.
3
  Criminalizing reasonable suspicion that societal-harmful 
conduct has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur—even when a 
crime‘s definition also includes innocuous omissions, possession, or con-
duct—is the criminalization of suspicion.  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
waffled on whether the criminalization of reasonable suspicion in this con-
text violates the national Constitution.  In 1983, the Court held in Kolender 
v. Lawson
4
 that the Constitution bars the government from criminalizing an 
American citizen‘s failure to answer identification questions or the failure 
to satisfy a government agent‘s subjective criteria for an adequate identifi-
cation, when that agent had only a reasonable suspicion that the citizen had 
committed, was committing, or was about to commit some unspecified 
crime.  But in 2004, the Supreme Court decided in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial 
  
 * Professor of Law, Texas Southern University; LL.M., University of California, Berkeley (1971); 
J.D., State University of New York—Buffalo (1970); B.A., State University of New York—Buffalo 
(1967). 
 1. 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972).  A year earlier, Justice Stewart asserted that the government lacks 
power to criminalize based solely on circumstances that provided a basis for concluding that the ac-
cused was a suspicious person.  Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 546 (1971) (Stewart, J., con-
curring). 
 2. See infra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 4. 461 U.S. 352, 359 n.9 (1983) (concluding the privilege against self-incrimination is implicated 
when persons are compelled to answer such questions).  The Court characterizes this freedom-
protecting rule as ―settled.‖  Id. 
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District Court
5
 that the national Constitution permits a state to criminalize 
an American citizen‘s mere refusal to respond to a government agent‘s 
demand for identification where, at the time of the request, the agent rea-
sonably suspects that the citizen had committed, was committing, or was 
about to commit any crime.
6
 
In between these two decisions, September 11th happened. 
This article evaluates whether the nation‘s highest appellate courts 
have, on balance, been more willing to acquiesce to criminalization based 
on suspicion since the attacks on the World Trade Center seven years ago.
7
  
The article seeks to accomplish this evaluation by comparing decisions of 
the United States and state supreme courts in the six years prior to Septem-
ber 2001 with decisions in the six years following the terrorist attack—
have the courts with the greatest authority to sanction the criminalization 
of suspicion been more willing to do just that?  Such a post-September 
11th trend would be significant because, despite the attacks, neither the 
national nor state governments have abolished or amended pertinent feder-
al and state constitutional protections of individual rights.
8
 
This article first defines criminalization, suspicion, and reasonable 
suspicion, based on policy and precedents from these supreme courts.  This 
article next combines these definitions to define what it means to ―crimi-
nalize suspicion.‖ 
The second section of the article begins with a comparative analysis of 
the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Hiibel with the most pertinent of 
the Court‘s prior precedents.9  The section continues with surveys of reac-
tions to Hiibel by the U.S. Supreme Court, commentators, and the states‘ 
legislatures and supreme courts.
10
 
The third section of the article is its core: a comparative examination 
of the decisions of the states‘ supreme courts in the six-year periods before 
and after September 11, 2001.  This principal section of the article ex-
amines decisions of the state supreme courts that can be fairly characte-
  
 5. 542 U.S. 177 (2004). 
 6. Id. at 184–85, 190–91. 
 7. For an article viewing the Hiibel decision as a diminution of individual rights possibly attributa-
ble to the September 11th terrorist attack, see Arnold H. Loewy, The Cowboy and the Cop: The Saga of 
Dudley Hiibel, 9/11, and the Vanishing Fourth Amendment, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 929, 942–43 (2005). 
 8. One legislative caveat is the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272 (2001), which has been criticized as seriously undermining the liberty interests of the American 
people.  See, e.g., Timothy Walczak, We Can Be Both Safe and Free: How the PATRIOT Act Threatens 
Civil Liberties, 76 PA. B. ASS‘N Q. 21, 22 (2005) (―Key Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act threaten 
fundamental American civil liberties.‖); Jeremy C. Smith, Comment, The USA PATRIOT Act: Violat-
ing Reasonable Expectations of Privacy Provided by the Fourth Amendment Without Advancing Na-
tional Security, 62 N.C. L. REV. 412, 453–54 (2003). 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. See infra Parts II.BE. 
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rized as implicating the constitutionality of criminalizing suspicion.  Cri-
minalization of suspicion is implicated in prosecutions involving a variety 
of crimes and concepts: obstruction of justice, stop-and-identify statutes, 
loitering, disorderly conduct, anti-car-cruising, and the status of the sus-
pect.  Criminalization based on the status of a suspect occurs through sex 
offender registration requirements, juvenile curfews, and the prosecution of 
gang members and suspected terrorists.  The great irony of these deci-
sions—and one of the key findings of this article—is that in the vast major-
ity of these decisions over the last dozen years, and even the decades pre-
ceding the study period, neither these courts nor the parties litigating these 
cases expressly recognized that criminalizing suspicion was implicated.
11
  
The article concludes by summarizing its key findings, recommending 
reforms to the most pertinent constitutional doctrines to curtail the crimina-
lization of suspicion, and offering perspectives on those findings and re-
forms and their future implications. 
B. Definitions 
In this article, ―criminalization‖ means: (1) a decision of a legislature 
which expressly declares that the subject of the enactment is a crime, or (2) 
a decision of a legislature to proscribe conduct, omissions, or possession, 
backed by at least the threat of the deprivation of liberty following a prose-
cution that results in a conviction.
12
 
In this article, ―suspicion‖ means a subjective belief (and therefore no 
evidence that a government interest is actually at stake), by either the ex-
ecutive or legislative branch of the federal or state governments, that a 
specific or even unspecified crime has occurred, is occurring, or is immi-
  
 11. Since 1980, only three state supreme court opinions—and no U.S. Supreme Court decisions—
have made reference to ―criminalizing‖ and ―suspicion‖ in the same paragraph.  See Commonwealth v. 
Dellamano, 469 N.E.2d 1254, 1257 (Mass. 1984); State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 429–30 (Tenn. 
2000) (Byers, Special J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Worrell, 761 P.2d 56, 61 (Wash. 1984) 
(Utter, J., concurring). 
 12. In approximately ten decisions over the past several decades, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a 
strong presumption for the first definition of criminalization—as a strategy to subordinate certain 
national constitutional rights, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, double jeopardy, ex post 
facto, and the right to a jury trial (all of which make some reference in their text to ―criminal‖ proceed-
ings or prosecutions), to the decisionmaking of the national Congress and any and every state and local 
legislature.  The Court has interpreted the reference to ―criminal‖ to be a qualifying reference.  See, 
e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003).  For an example of the first definition of criminalization by 
a state supreme court, see Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252, 257–58 (Alaska 2004), in 
which failure to obey a juvenile curfew ordinance had been declared a crime.  For other commentators‘ 
definitions of criminalization, see Stuart Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress: Over-
criminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1542–43 (1997). 
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nent, thus affording a reason to at least ―encounter‖ one or more persons.13  
An ―encounter‖ is an attempt—which may be pursued even if the suspect 
takes public flight—by the government to consensually engage a person in 
a public space, or at that person‘s home or place of business, to confirm or 
disprove the subjective suspicion that prompted the government to attempt 
to initiate the interaction.
14
 
In this article, ―reasonable suspicion‖ means a 2 to 15 percent likeli-
hood, based on some evidence possessed by either the executive or legisla-
tive branch of the federal or state governments, that the person or persons 
―stopped‖ has committed, is committing, or will imminently commit a spe-
cific or even unspecified crime, therefore providing a reason to seize-stop 
or possibly to search-frisk a suspect, and, if thereafter justified—or if the 
government at least believes it is justified—to further seize and/or search, 




 13. The U.S. Supreme Court, in approximately ten decisions, piggybacked this ―encounter‖ regime 
on top of the ―reasonable suspicion‖ regime.  United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 203–04 (2002) 
(finding no seizure, only an encounter); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (finding 
no seizure); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (finding no seizure, only an encounter); California 
v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991) (finding no seizure, only an encounter); Brower v. County of 
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598–99 (1989) (finding seizure); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988) 
(finding no seizure, only an encounter); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (finding no seizure, 
only an encounter); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 559–60 (1980) (finding no seizure, 
only an encounter); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (finding seizure); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 659 (1979) (finding seizure, but no encounter since it is not possible to ―encounter‖ a single 
moving vehicle); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 876 (1975) (finding seizure, but no 
encounter since it is not possible to ―encounter‖ a single moving vehicle in the interior of the U.S.).  
Over the last dozen years, state supreme courts have decided over five hundred cases which implicated 
the West Key Number—Arrest, Key 68—which purports to identify decisions implicating what is and 
is not a seizure.  See also Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coer-
cion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 155–56 (2002) (criticizing the premise of the entire ―encounter‖ regime 
by pointing out that empirical evidence casts grave doubt on the hypothesis that people feel free to 
leave a public discourse with a government agent initiated by that agent). 
 14. See generally Margaret Raymond, The Right to Refuse and the Obligation to Comply: Challeng-
ing the Gamesmanship Model of Criminal Procedure, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1483, 1484–85 (2007) (focus-
ing her theses on appropriate constitutional analysis of ―encounters,‖ although needlessly qualifying 
―encounter‖ with the word ―consensual‖); Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Construction and Application of 
Rule Permitting Knock and Talk Visits Under Fourth Amendment and State Constitutions, 15 
A.L.R.6TH 515 (2007) (discussing attempts to encounter persons in their homes). 
 15. Twelve U.S. Supreme Court decisions are listed in the West Key Number System as having 
directly engaged in defining reasonable suspicion over the last four decades in the context of a seizure.  
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004) (finding reasonable suspicion); United 
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (finding reasonable suspicion); City of Indianapolis v. 
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000) (finding no reasonable suspicion); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 
(2000) (finding no reasonable suspicion); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (finding 
reasonable suspicion); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (holding that determination of 
reasonable suspicion should be made de novo); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) (finding 
reasonable suspicion); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 9 (1989) (finding reasonable suspicion 
and defining it as some minimal level of objective suspicion); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 
234 (1985) (finding reasonable suspicion); Brown, 443 U.S. at 51–52 (finding no reasonable suspi-
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The major thesis of this article is that, given these definitions, there are 
two independent strains of criminalization based on suspicion.  First, legis-
latures define certain crimes—for example, loitering—to directly criminal-
ize suspicion as defined in this article, and the inquiry of this article is 
whether supreme courts since 2001 have increasingly sanctioned the con-
stitutionality of such legislation.  Hence criminalizing suspicion as defined 
herein has mirror-image connotations.  The government perceives then 
reflects in the penal code that under certain or generic circumstances, cer-
tain conduct, omissions, or citizens‘ statuses are sufficiently suspicious to 
warrant government intervention and ultimately the possibility that the 
identified citizen will be convicted.  Second, increasingly the executive 
branch of governments, relying on the supreme courts‘ creation and sanc-
tioning of ―consensual encounters‖ and ―reasonable suspicion‖ as a basis to 
seize, have employed investigative techniques justified solely by suspicion 
as defined in this article, and the supreme courts in turn, since 2001, have 
increasingly sanctioned criminalizing any refusal of a suspect to obey these 
investigative techniques.  These courts, for example, have increasingly 
sanctioned the criminalization of lies told to a government agent during an 
encounter or a stop, despite the fact that the agent either had no evidence of 
the commission of any crime or only evidence arguably implicating unspe-
cified criminal activity.
16
  Preliminary support for the significance of the 
independence of these definitions is that Justice Douglas, in his solo dis-
sent in the seminal Terry case, condemned the reasonable suspicion doc-
trine‘s creation, but would have sanctioned criminalization of suspicion by 
the legislature so defining loitering.
17
  Such judicial sanctioning of the cri-
  
cion); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883 (finding no reasonable suspicion); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
30 (1968) (finding reasonable suspicion). 
  In the last decade, twenty-two state supreme court decisions were listed as having engaged in 
analyzing reasonable suspicion.  Among the listed decisions, six of them actually address, directly and 
in detail, the definition of reasonable suspicion.  See, e.g., State v. Ramirez, 100 P.3d 94, 98 (Kan. 
2004) (finding one or two factors sufficient to constitute ―reasonable suspicion‖).  For recognition by 
other commentators of the ephemeral nature of ―reasonable suspicion‖ as a proof standard, see also 
Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of the Neigh-
borhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 100 (1999), where the author noted, 
in stating the thesis of her article, that observations of little significance in proving commission of a 
crime are held sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion once courts credit neighborhood character 
as a factor supporting a finding of reasonable suspicion.  Id. at 104–08.  She concluded that courts were 
reluctant to state the percentage of probability of crime commission necessary to justify a conclusion of 
reasonable suspicion, but noted a 1981 article in which a scholar estimated that it was a 5 to 40 percent 
probability that a crime was committed, was in the process of being committed, or was imminent.  See 
Neil Ackerman, Considering the Two-Tier Model of The Fourth Amendment, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 
112 (1981); see also United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569, 1572 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a 2.5 
percent likelihood that suspect could be found in any one of forty hotel rooms constituted reasonable 
suspicion). 
 16. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 17. Terry, 392 U.S. at 35–36, 38–39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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minalization of suspicion is a totally unacceptable interests-reconciliation 
in today‘s democracy, and is unconstitutional under express provisions of 
both the federal Constitution and most state constitutions.
18
 
II.  HIIBEL VERSUS PRE-HIIBEL: U.S. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CRIMINALIZING SUSPICION & POST-HIIBEL 
REACTION TO THAT DECISION BY THE SUPREME COURTS, STATE 
LEGISLATURES, AND COMMENTATORS 
A. Comparison of Hiibel with Pre-Hiibel U.S. Supreme Court Precedent 
on the Constitutionality of Criminalizing Suspicion 
In 1944, less than three years after what some may consider the twen-
tieth century‘s most notorious terrorist attack against the United States, the 
U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned for the first time criminalization based on 
subjective suspicion.
19
  While the anxiety and fear caused by that attack 
explains the decision, it surely did not justify the Court‘s acquiescence in 
the suspension of constitutional protections prohibiting such criminaliza-
tion, particularly when the suspicion was founded solely upon status—the 
prohibited equal protection category of race.
20
  It is not surprising that Jus-
tice Kennedy‘s majority opinion in Hiibel did not cite the Korematsu deci-
sion as supporting precedent. 
Approximately three decades after Korematsu, a unanimous Supreme 
Court effectively held that it was unconstitutional to criminalize based on, 
first, objectively reasonable suspicion of government agents and even leg-
islatures, and later, the subjective suspicion of a government agent.
21
  The 
Court, however, in its 1979 decision, did not cite to its 1972 decision, fail-
ing to recognize the scope and significance of that decision‘s implica-
tions—including the fact that its 1972 decision subsumed the principle 
  
 18. Martin Estrada, Criminalizing Silence: Hiibel and the Continuing Expansion of the Terry Doc-
trine, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 279, 286 (2005). 
 19. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223–24 (1944). 
 20. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886); Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: 
Japanese Americans Redress & African-American Claims, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 477, 489–90 
(1998). 
 21. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (prohibiting criminalization of the refusal to 
cooperate with a government agent‘s investigation which the agent instigated based only upon his 
subjective suspicion); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972) (prohibiting the 
government from criminalizing based solely on status or innocuous conduct that for historical or other 
reasons had conjured government suspicion of possible crime). 
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adopted in the second case, and therefore made an express statement in 
conflict with those implications.
22
 
These opinions of the Court made no reference to Korematsu, and 
therefore failed to recognize the conflict between that decision‘s sanction-
ing criminalization based on subjective suspicion of an entire American 
minority racial group and the Court‘s current opinions.23  The Court there-
fore did not perceive or seize either opportunity to overrule that pernicious 
decision. 
Thirty-two years later, the majority opinion in Hiibel cited both of 
these 1970s decisions.
24
  Justice Kennedy, however, made no reference to 
the Papachristou principle prohibiting criminalization based on suspicion.  
Instead, the Hiibel Court referenced Papachristou for the proposition that 
it held unconstitutional a traditional vagrancy statute for overbreadth and 
vagueness, because its words of criminalization were too imprecise to pro-
vide citizens adequate notice, and because it gave police, judges, and juries 
too much discretion in determining which conduct to criminalize.
25
  Justice 
Kennedy failed to precisely restate the specific standards he believed the 
  
 22. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 169; Brown, 443 U.S. at 52.  In Brown, the Court expressly reserved 
determining if non-cooperation with the government could be criminalized when the government had at 
least reasonable suspicion of some perhaps unspecified criminal activity.  443 U.S. at 53 n.3.  Remark-
ably, the Court decided to reserve decision on this issue despite the fact it was squarely presented in the 
case and acknowledged by the trial judge.  Id.  Chief Justice Burger included as an appendix an excerpt 
from the trial transcript which he characterized as demonstrating that the trial judge was troubled by the 
spectacle of empowering the government to criminalize the refusal of a detainee to identify himself 
when the government had only reasonable suspicion to stop him.  Id. at 53.  The 1972 proclamation of 
the Court was made in a context which seemingly meant that the Court was at that point in time prohi-
biting the federal and state governments from arresting—much less prosecuting and then convicting—
persons based merely on suspicion.  The Court‘s proclamation came just five years after it first autho-
rized the government to seize persons short of arresting them by stopping them, based on its invention 
of a proof standard less than probable cause which it characterized as reasonable suspicion.  Terry, 392 
U.S. at 30.  While not expressly citing to the Terry decision, the Court‘s proclamation in Papachristou 
must be taken to encompass prohibiting arrest, prosecution, and conviction based on such reasonable 
suspicion, because the Court expressly—in support of the blanket statement prohibiting criminalization 
based on suspicion which began this article—made a disapproving reference to statistics proving large 
scale arrest on the bases of vagrancy and suspicion of some crime, and immediately followed that 
reference by approvingly citing the assertion that constitutional convictions should start with the gov-
ernment having—at the time of the initial seizure—probable cause of at least an attempt regarding a 
specific crime by the accused.  Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 16869.  Of course, this would mean that 
only if the government amassed sufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt non-compliance 
with a permissible government investigatory technique at the time of that probable cause could it secure 
a conviction.  Id. at 169–70. 
 23. The Court in Brown did, however, cite to an even earlier precedent involving criminalization of 
suspicion: Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).  Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.  Chief Justice Burger 
cited Lanzetta as additional authority for the proposition that in order for a government agent to seize 
an individual legally, the government must have objective facts to support that seizure.  Id.  He failed to 
note that Lanzetta was a case not focused on a temporary seizure, but conviction based on a subjective-
ly suspicious status.  See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 24. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 184 (2004). 
 25. Id. 
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Court employed in 1972 to conclude that the crime‘s definition was too 
vague.  Instead, he merely restated that conclusion. 
Focusing the Constitutional defect on imprecise language restored the 
possibility—which later became a reality—that legislatures could criminal-
ize reasonable suspicion by using it as a basis to authorize government 
investigatory techniques, which, if the citizen refused to comply, could be 
criminalized, even if that conduct was doing and saying nothing.
26
  Justice 
Kennedy characterized Brown as only prohibiting a government agent 
from conducting a stop and demanding that a citizen identify himself when 
he lacks reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is commit-
ting, or is about to commit a crime.
27
  He failed to make reference to the 
fact that the Brown decision prohibited criminalization based on refusal to 
cooperate with this investigatory technique. 
The citation to Brown in the majority opinion in Hiibel did not prevent 
the Court from departing from its 1979 holding by blurring—to the point 
of obliterating—the difference between criminalizing on the basis of sub-
jective rather than reasonable suspicion.  The Hiibel decision asserted, 
without reference to any evidence and contrary to the weight of evidence 
available to the Court, that the government agent had reasonable suspicion 
prior to demanding that Hiibel identify himself.
28
  Justice Kennedy failed 
to discuss or apply the Court‘s precedent defining reasonable suspicion or 
discuss the fact that the government agent failed to try to determine the 
reality of the alleged assault—perhaps by asking the only possible alleged 
victim, who, unknown to the agent, was Hiibel‘s daughter, whether Hiibel 
actually struck her, or trying to determine the extent to which a viewing of 
the alleged victim would confirm the alleged assault.  Even more telling 
was the failure of Justice Kennedy to refer in the record or comment upon 
whether Hiibel was ever arrested, prosecuted or convicted for the alleged 
assault or any other crime besides the obstruction of an officer for refusing 
to identify himself.  In fact, Hiibel was arrested for only one other charge, 
domestic violence, and that charge was abandoned by the state prior to 
trial.
29
 Therefore, precisely sixty years after its Korematsu decision, the 
Court perhaps again reacted to a major terrorist attack by opening the door 
to upholding the power of the federal and state governments to criminalize 
based only on subjective suspicion, albeit this time a sanctioning de facto 
rather than de jure.  
  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 18082. 
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Hiibel reverted to Korematsu‘s extremely liberal authorization of cri-
minalization, despite the fact that the Court had in five decisions over a 
span of sixty years, 1939 to 1999, based on a number of constitutional 
rights, barred the federal and state governments from criminalizing suspi-
cion—including reasonable suspicion—when that suspicion was based 
solely or primarily on a status that signaled crime or crime potential to a 
legislature or at least one government agent.
30
  The Court had held that 
mere public place association with gang members, a persistent evening 
stroller, addicts, ex-felons, and gangsters, could not be convicted of a 
crime based on each of those statuses, or the suspicion emanating from 
each status in the collective or individual minds of the government.  A con-
stitutional policy theme present in all of these decisions was the Court‘s 
concern that the criminalization of status alone—or even when a suspicious 
status is combined with innocuous omissions or conduct—is criminaliza-
tion based only on suspicion.
31
  In the 1999 decision, just two years before 
September 11, 2001, and only five years before Hiibel, the Court held that 
the criminalization of the refusal to obey a government agent‘s order for a 
public gathering to disperse infringed protected liberty interests, because 
the order was based solely on the agent‘s reasonable suspicion that at least 
one of the loiterers was a member of a street gang.
32
 
The Hiibel majority opinion made express reference to only one of 
these decisions, the crucial and heretofore mentioned 1983 decision in Ko-
  
 30. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (plurality opinion) (involving a gang mem-
ber and persons standing in public with a gang member); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 361 
(1983) (involving a stroller); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (involving addicts); 
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229–30 (1957) (involving ex-felons); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 
U.S. 451 (1939) (involving gangsters). 
 31. Morales, 527 U.S. at 51 n.15 (discussing how the Illinois Supreme Court characterized the City 
of Chicago‘s intent to criminalize intolerable street gang members); Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358; Robin-
son, 370 U.S. at 667 (discussing how the state failed to offer any medical evidence to prove that the 
accused was addicted, but government enforcement agents suspected he was addicted); Lambert, 355 
U.S. at 229; Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 458 (expressly recognizing that the ―gangster‖ crime definition did 
not include within its definition either a conduct or a substitute omission element).  In Lambert, the 
accused was arrested of suspicion of some unspecified crime, but prosecuted for only the failure to 
register as an ex-felon.  355 U.S. at 226.  The Court suggested that the purpose of the registration crime 
was but a convenience for law enforcement to keep track of ex-felons.  Id. at 229.  The inference is that 
this tracking facilitated the ability to locate ex-felons as potential suspects. 
 32. Morales, 527 U.S. at 64.  Tens of thousands of American citizens were arrested and prosecuted 
for this crime based only on reasonable suspicion in just a few years during the 1990s.  Id. at 49.  De-
spite this reality, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed no specific alarm about the specter of a police 
state.  See generally id. at 4564.  Further, despite citing and relying on Kolender and Papachristou, 
neither the former‘s rejection of the idea that escalation of crime and threat to society does not justify 
diminution of constitutional protections, nor the latter‘s broad condemnation of criminalization based 
on suspicion, were repeated by the Court.  In fact, at the end of his opinion, in dicta, Justice Stevens 
suggested that it might be constitutional to criminalize based solely on reasonable suspicion of the 
status of street gang member, if all such persons standing in public had such status.  Id. at 62. 
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lender.
33
  Justice O‘Connor‘s majority opinion in Kolender held that rea-
sonable suspicion of a crime and a government agent‘s demand for identi-
fication from the suspect could not constitutionally justify the criminaliza-
tion of the accused‘s refusal to answer questions about his identity or the 
suspect‘s failure to adequately respond to a demand for identification based 
on a standardless evaluation of the adequacy of the suspect‘s response un-
dertaken by government agents and ultimately the trier of fact.
34
 
The Kolender majority opinion did not cite to Korematsu, Lambert, or 
Robinson, but did cite to Lanzetta, Papachristou, and Brown v. Texas.
35
  It 
cited to Lanzetta twice.
36
  First, Lanzetta was among a string of its own 
precedent which established the principle that the standard the legislature 
must meet in adequately drafting the definition of any crime is more strin-
gent than that for civil statutes, and therefore a crime may fail to satisfy 
that standard even if the definition could be construed to satisfy the stan-
dard of minimal clarity as applied to some course of conduct.
37
  Second, 
and more significantly for the primary thesis of this article, Lanzetta was 
the sole precedent cited as support for the principle that constitutional re-
straints on criminalization cannot be subordinated to government claims 
that the times demand less liberty in order to respond to outbreaks of law-
lessness that threaten society.
38
 
The majority opinion in Kolender also cited to Papachristou twice.  In 
each instance, Papachristou was cited as one among a string of its own 
precedents which established both key concerns of the vagueness doc-
trine.
39
  First, the definition of a crime must provide potential defendants 
with reasonable notice of the conduct and/or circumstances that provide the 
basis for the criminalization decision.
40
  Second, the Court raised the con-
cern that those enforcing, as well as those evaluating guilt or innocence of 
the crime as trier of fact, will be left to their own predilections, including 
discrimination against particular groups as to what the legislature intends 
to criminalize.
41
  For some inexplicable reason, Kolender, Hiibel, and all of 
the Supreme Court precedent articulating the vagueness doctrine continue 
  
 33. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 34. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360 n.9.  The first part of the assertion, of course, is in direct conflict with 
the Court‘s holding in Hiibel, but is nevertheless accurate.  Justice O‘Connor asserted that criminaliz-
ing the refusal to answer Terry stop questions implicates the Fifth Amendment.  Id.  She then expressly 
endorsed as a settled principle that while police officers have the right to ask citizens to voluntarily 
answer questions concerning unsolved crimes, they have no right to compel them to answer.  Id. 
 35. Id. at 357, 358 n.5. 
 36. Id. at 356 n.8, 361. 
 37. Id. at 356 n.8. 
 38. Id. at 361. 
 39. Id. at 357. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 358. 
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to recite these two elements, despite the fact that it is obvious that concep-
tually they are identical and require the same analytical steps to fairly eva-
luate and resolve.
42
  Justice O‘Connor‘s opinion, however, did not make 
reference to the Papachristou Court‘s statement expressly and broadly 
condemning criminalization based on suspicion, despite the fact that her 
majority opinion did expressly recognize that substantive as well as proce-
dural due process restrained criminalization decisions.
43
 
The majority opinion in Kolender cited to Brown as support for the 
proposition that not even a stop, and hence certainly not a conviction, 
could be based on subjective suspicion without implicating Fourth 
Amendment concerns.
44
  As a logical matter, this meant the Court would 
prohibit any attempt to criminalize a refusal to cooperate with any gov-
ernment agent‘s investigatory techniques employed during an encounter or 
illegal seizure. 
In Hiibel, Justice Kennedy cited to Kolender for the proposition that 
the constitutional limits on criminalization identified in that decision were 
similar to those of the Papachristou decision.
45
  His majority opinion ab-
ruptly distinguished the Kolender holding from the Hiibel case by charac-
terizing its sole constitutional concern as vagueness of the criminalization 
language that risked citizen bewilderment as to what was prohibited, and 
also the danger that government agents had unfettered discretion to deter-
mine who to arrest, prosecute, and convict.
46
  Justice Kennedy made no 
reference to the California Penal Code provision that was the basis for the 
Kolender prosecution, which by its own terms only criminalized a person‘s 
refusal to identify herself and account for her presence when the govern-
ment had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
47
  Crucially, neither he 
nor the majority opinion in Kolender recognized that the judicial expansion 
of the California crime was just that—an alternative basis for criminaliza-
tion focusing on an assessment by a government agent regarding the quali-
ty of the response by a suspect who chose to attempt to respond to a de-
mand for identification by a government agent acting with reasonable sus-
picion.  Nor did the Hiibel majority acknowledge that the Court in Kolend-
er did not know the facts of the fifteen situations in which Mr. Lawson was 
stopped, or whether there was a basis for concluding in any of those situa-
tions whether the government agents had reasonable suspicion before they 
  
 42. See infra notes 176–87 and accompanying text. 
 43. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358. 
 44. Id. at 357. 
 45. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 188 (2004). 
 46. Id. 
 47. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 1983).  The law was found unconstitutionally vague by the 
Court, and later amended.  Kolender, 461 U.S. at 36162. 
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encountered or stopped Mr. Lawson.
48
  This admission of ignorance con-
cerning the actual details of the facts of what happened during these stops 
also encompassed what Mr. Lawson did in response to the government 
agent‘s demand for identification and whether Mr. Lawson simply refused 
to identify himself.
49
  Most significantly, the majority opinion in Hiibel 
failed to acknowledge that the majority opinion in Kolender had expressly 
asserted that the Fifth Amendment‘s privilege against self-incrimination 
bars states and the federal government from criminalizing the refusal of a 
suspect to comply with a demand for identification by the government 
based only on reasonable suspicion.
50
  Ironically, Justice O‘Connor, who 
wrote the majority opinion in Kolender, must have changed her mind about 
this constitutional protection in the intervening two decades between Ko-
lender and Hiibel because she was also in the majority in Hiibel, and her 
vote was necessary to Hiibel‘s repudiation of that constitutional protection 
against the criminalization of suspicion.  Instead, the Hiibel majority 
thought it was decisive, with respect to Kolender‘s protection, that Hiibel 
on appeal did not even claim that the Nevada Penal Code‘s criminalization 
was unconstitutionally vague, despite the fact that the Nevada crime defini-
tion was almost identical to the California statute.
51
  Hence Hiibel signaled 
the Court‘s exceedingly fine line-drawing—if the government has reasona-
ble suspicion, a flat refusal to respond to a demand for identification could 
be criminalized but not an attempt to respond that did not meet an unspeci-
fied standard of clarity. 
Obviously the majority‘s position in Hiibel ignored the core principle 
stated in Papapchristou: no matter how clearly the government articulates 
its intent, it is unconstitutional to criminalize based solely on suspicion of 
another crime—especially an unspecified crime—when the conduct that 
gave rise to the suspicion falls far short of constituting even an attempt of 
that other crime.  Justice Kennedy was also unfaithful to the Court‘s own 
precedent, discussed in the proceeding paragraphs, that barred criminaliza-
tion based on suspicion or the failure of a person to cooperate with the 
government‘s demand that the citizen dispel that suspicion.  He was forced 
to acknowledge that another decision of the Court, outside the context of 
criminalization of suspicion, included language expressly stating this latter 
  
 48. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 354 n.2. 
 49. Id.  Justice Kennedy failed to acknowledge that for possibly these reasons, the district court‘s 
holding in favor of Mr. Lawson had been reached and decided in direct conflict with the holding in 
Hiibel, and determined that it was unconstitutional to criminalize a refusal to identify in response to a 
government demand based only upon reasonable suspicion.  Id. 
 50. Id. at 359 n.9. 
 51. Id.  Compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.280 (2003), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West 1983). 
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corollary.
52
  He then falsely characterized that language, however, as mere 
dicta.
53
  The U.S. Supreme Court has therefore waffled in only two deci-
sions, both of which followed within a few years of catastrophic terrorist 
attacks, regarding whether criminalization based on suspicion—which in 
turn was based upon no, few, or a small quantum of facts—violates the 
national constitution. 
B. Reaction to Hiibel: The U.S. Supreme Court, 2004–2007 
The U.S. Supreme Court has cited Hiibel twice in the first three years 
after the decision.
54
  Neither citation, however, could be characterized as 
reconfirming the constitutionality of criminalizing suspicion. 
C. Reaction to Hiibel: Commentators 
Commentators on the Hiibel decision have almost universally con-
demned the constitutional analysis of the majority opinion.
55
  Some of 
them have speculated that September 11th may have influenced the majori-
ty‘s decision to depart from its own precedents and principles.56 
  
 52. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187 (2004) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 
U.S. 420, 439 (1984)) (stating that with reasonable suspicion a government agent may ask the suspect a 
moderate number of questions the purpose of which is to dispel that suspicion, but indicating that the 
accused is not obligated to respond). 
 53. Id. at 187.  In fact, the assertion was integral to Justice Marshall‘s policy-interests reconciliation 
in Berkemer.  468 U.S. at 43840.  Justice Marshall reasoned that Miranda warnings need not be given 
at the outset of a reasonable-suspicion-based seizure because of a variety of factors, including the 
suspect‘s right not to respond to questions.  Id. at 440.  Justice Kennedy acknowledged as much just 
before making his second ―dicta‖ characterization in reference to Berkemer.  Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 187.  
Unfortunately for the intellectual integrity of Justice Kennedy and those who signed on to his opinion, 
his  second ―dicta‖ characterization seems based upon his earlier, completely unrelated characterization 
that Berkemer cited to Brown in dicta.  See id. 
 54. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 (2006); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 419 (2005) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 55. Joseph R. Ashby, Note, Declining to State a Name: In Consideration of the Fifth Amendment’s 
Self-Incrimination Clause and Law Enforcement Databases After Hiibel, 104 MICH. L. REV. 779 
(2006); Estrada, supra note 18, at 286; Trevor A. Hickey, Note and Comment, Expanding Terry: Com-
pulsory Identification in Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, Humbolt County, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 
387 (2005); James Ryan Kelly, Note, Is Silence Golden? Not After Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District 
Court of Nevada, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155 (2006) (discussing how the Supreme Court‘s 
decision jeopardizes basic liberties protected by the fourth and fifth amendments, and is based on 
logical contradictions which created a rule with problematic applications); Loewy, supra note 7, at 937; 
Michael D. Treacy, Comment, Hiibel v. The Sixth Judicial Court of Nevada: Is a Suspect’s Refusal to 
Identify Himself Protected by the Fifth Amendment?, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 897 (2006).  But see Robert 
A. Hull, What Hath Hiibel Wrought?: The Constitutionality of Compelled Self-Identification, 33 PEPP. 
L. REV. 185, 224 (2005) (arguing that Hiibel does not unjustifiably or seriously threaten civil liberties). 
 56. Hickey, supra note 55, at 407, 411; Loewy, supra note 7, at 935. 
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D. Reaction to Hiibel: State Legislatures 
Of the twenty state stop-and-frisk statutes cited in Hiibel, only two of 
the annotations to those statutes made reference to Hiibel by late 2007.
57
  
One of the two citations was for the purpose of using Hiibel as support for 
authorizing only an arrest, but the other more accurately cited it as authori-
ty to support a conviction based only on a person‘s refusal to give identifi-
cation to a law enforcement officer during an investigatory stop.
58
 
E. Reaction to Hiibel: State Supreme Courts 
Twelve state supreme courts, in fifteen decisions, have cited to Hiibel 
in the years since that decision was announced by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.
59
  Three of these state supreme courts have cited Hiibel with appar-
ent approval, or at least acceptance, of what they interpret as Hiibel‘s en-
dorsement of the right of the government to initiate encounters with citi-
zens and demand identification without a scintilla of evidence to support 
that demand, and even without having to reciprocate by offering identifica-
tion as a government agent—hence potentially sanctioning criminalization 
based on subjective suspicion.
60
  One of these state high courts reasoned 
that a citizen‘s right to walk or run away from an attempted illegal stop by 
  
 57. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 215.1(A) (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.24 (West 2007); 
Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 182. 
 58. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 215.1(A) (conviction); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.24 (arrest). 
 59. State v. Baez, 894 So. 2d 115, 125 (Fla. 2004) (Pariente, C.J., dissenting); Hardister v. State, 849 
N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. 2006); State v. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d 78, 82 (Iowa 2004); State v. Smith, 683 
N.W.2d 542, 548 n.5 (Iowa 2004); In re Ariel G., 858 A.2d 1007, 1013–14 (Md. 2004); People v. 
Jenkins, 691 N.W.2d 759, 764 (Mich. 2005); Nev. Comm‘n on Ethics v. Ballard, 102 P.3d 544, 548 
n.22 (Nev. 2004); State v. Crawley, 901 A.2d 924, 936 n.9 (N.J. 2006); State v. Pineiro, 853 A.2d 887, 
891 (N.J. 2004); State v. Mathre, 683 N.W.2d 918, 924 (N.D. 2004); Commonwealth v. Ickes, 873 
A.2d 698, 701 (Pa. 2005); State v. Markland, 112 P.3d 507, 513 (Utah 2005); State v. Mechling, 633 
S.E.2d 311, 322 (W. Va. 2006); State v. Young, 717 N.W.2d 729, 749 n.20 (Wis. 2006); In re Mark, 
718 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Wis. 2006). 
 60. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d at 82 (finding that no seizure occurred and therefore no Fourth Amend-
ment protections were implicated); Jenkins, 691 N.W.2d at 764; Crawley, 901 A.2d at 933–34 (citing 
Hiibel for other propositions, the state supreme court nevertheless expressly authorized criminalization 
of flight from government agents when those agents have not reasonable suspicion, but a good faith 
belief in reasonable suspicion of some unspecified crime); Pineiro, 853 A.2d at 891.  First the court in 
Pineiro cited, with apparent approval, the constitutional limiting principle that when the government 
attempts to engage a citizen in such an encounter, the citizen may decline the invitation and is free to 
go on his way without answering any question.  Id.  It immediately followed recitation of this principle 
with a ―cf.‖ reference to Hiibel.  Id.  This reference was followed by the court‘s characterization of the 
Hiibel holding: that it was constitutional for a government agent to initiate such an encounter and 
―request‖ identification anytime there were suspicious circumstances.  Id.  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court at this point in its restatement of Hiibel appeared to deliberately omit that Hiibel required that the 
circumstances must provide a reasonable basis for the government agent to believe criminal activity of 
some sort had occurred, was occurring, or was about to occur.  See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 
542 U.S. 177, 18889 (2004). 
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government agents—a seizure which should require minimal evidence to 
justify it—can be criminalized because the government agents are likely to 
continue their illegal conduct and perhaps even resort to deadly force to 
effectuate the illegal seizure of the citizen.
61
  This, of course, means that 
after September 11th, state courts of last resort have interpreted Hiibel as 
establishing a national standard that sanctions ignoring completely the mo-
tives of particular government agents for encounters and the ensuing re-
quests for identification.  This suggests that the agent‘s motive can be rac-
ist, sexist, or simply a result of the particular agent‘s bad night or dislike of 
the looks, smell, or speech of the targeted citizen.  A person may retain the 
right to walk, but not run, from such encounters, as flight by itself is a basis 
for criminalization. 
Three other state supreme courts have cited Hiibel with apparent ap-
proval, or at least acceptance, of its authorization of the government to 
demand that citizens produce identification when the government has at 
least reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or 
is about to commit a specific or even an unspecified crime—any crime.62  
Two of these courts, and one of the courts sanctioning seizures based on 
subjective suspicion, have cited with approval Hiibel‘s policy evaluation 
that the government has important interests at stake in initiating such en-
counters or seizures which justify sanctioning its authority to demand iden-
tification of those they reasonably suspect have committed, are commit-
ting, or are about to commit a crime.
63
 
Two other state supreme courts have cited Hiibel with apparent ap-
proval, or at least acceptance, of its interpretation of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, which requires a person asserting the privilege to prove 
he qualifies for the privilege, in part by showing that the statement was 
likely to be incriminating.
64
  These courts have therefore agreed with the 
Hiibel decision‘s interpretation of the privilege against self-incrimination 
that requires—because of the bald assertion that compliance is not likely to 
be incriminating—citizens to yield to the government‘s demand for identi-
fication documents in situations where the citizen is a suspect in a criminal 
investigation which has proceeded to the point that the government has 




 61. Crawley, 901 A.2d at 933–34. 
 62. Hardister, 849 N.E.2d at 570; Markland, 112 P.3d at 512; Mechling, 633 S.E.2d at 322. 
 63. Jenkins, 691 N.W.2d at 764; Markland, 112 P.3d at 512 n.2; Mechling, 633 S.E.2d at 322. 
 64. In re Ariel G., 858 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Md. 2004); Ballard, 102 P.3d at 548 n.22; see also In re 
Mark, 718 N.W.2d at 96 (erroneously characterizing Hiibel as focusing its holding on the qualification 
for the privilege that the statement must be ―compelled‖ by the government). 
 65. In re Ariel G., 858 A.2d at 1013. 
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Only one state supreme court has sought to distinguish Hiibel by as-
serting that the government has no interests to justify criminalizing the 
failure to comply with a demand for identification based on subjective sus-
picion; but this court nevertheless found that the state‘s important interests 
justify such criminalization where based on objectively reasonable suspi-
cion.
66
  The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that there was no dan-
ger to the public or the police when a person merely refused to identify 
himself to government agents acting on the subjective suspicion that the 
person has committed some crime.
67
  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
failed to explain the threat to these interests where the government agent 
has only evidence of a small probability, as opposed to a good faith belief, 
that the accused may have committed some unspecified crime at the time 
the agent asks for the identification. 
III.  HAVE STATE SUPREME COURTS BEEN MORE WILLING TO SANCTION 
THE CRIMINALIZATION OF SUSPICION POST-SEPTEMBER 11TH?  
COMPARING THE SIX YEARS PRE- & POST-SEPTEMBER 11TH 
A. State Supreme Courts: Pre-September 11th 
In the six years prior to September 11, 2001, the high courts in seven 
states—Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Tennessee, and 
Washington—prohibited potential or actual attempts by the government to 
criminalize subjective suspicion by a government agent or the legislature.
68
  
In 2001, prior to September 11th, the Michigan high court held that a gov-
ernment agent could not, based on his subjective suspicion, initiate an en-
counter with a citizen, and if the citizen lied during that encounter with 
regard to a matter relevant to that suspicion, use that lie as the basis to ar-
rest, prosecute, and convict that person for obstruction of justice.
69
  Even 
more significantly, the Louisiana court, just three years prior to September 
11th, in a decision directly in conflict with the subsequent Hiibel decision, 
declared unconstitutional as violative of both the vagueness and over-
breadth doctrines a legislative attempt to criminalize reasonable suspi-
  
 66. State v. Crawley, 901 A.2d 924, 936 n.9 (N.J. 2006). 
 67. Id. (discussing how if a suspect runs when the government only has subjective, but good faith, 
suspicion, the government has interests adequate to uphold criminalizing that flight). 
 68. See generally Johnson v. State, 37 S.W.3d 191 (Ark. 2001) (Brown, J., concurring); Johnson v. 
Athens-Clarke County, 529 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2000); City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53 (Ill. 
1997); State v. Muschkat, 706 So. 2d 429 (La. 1998); People v. Vasquez, 631 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 
2001); State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Mendez, 970 P.2d 722 (Wash. 2000). 
 69. Vasquez, 631 N.W.2d at 718. 
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cion.
70
  The court expressly recognized that part of the loitering statute in 
question was designed to criminalize status and constitutionally protected 
conduct.
71
  The crucial criminalization element of the statute was not based 
on the conduct of any person prosecuted under the statute, but on unspeci-
fied ―circumstances‖ deemed to do that which they could not possibly do: 
prove the suspect‘s involvement in drug-related criminal activity.72  The 
Louisiana court also reviewed the decisions of three other state supreme 
courts, which between 1980 and 1993 had split on the constitutionality of 
criminalizing suspicion of drug-related loitering.
73
  In 2000, the Georgia 
high court reached an almost identical conclusion about an almost identical 
crime in its loitering statute.
74
 
During the same six-year period immediately preceding September 
11th, however, ten state supreme courts—California, Connecticut, Indiana, 
Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, West Virgin-
ia, and Wisconsin—in twelve decisions, sanctioned expressly or by impli-
cation the constitutionality of criminalizing on the basis of reasonable sus-
picion, and in some cases, subjective suspicion.
75
  The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, ignoring the pernicious racist implications of the facts of the case, 
held that lying to government agents acting only on their subjective suspi-
cion could be criminalized.
76
  The Washington court asserted that a pas-
senger‘s refusal to obey an order to get out of or stay in a motor vehicle, or 
stop walking away from the vehicle, following a stop of the accused based 
on a government agent‘s reasonable suspicion or safety concerns, may be a 





 70. Muschkat, 706 So. 2d at 435–36 (striking down a drug crime loitering statute that provided for 
punishment of up to six months in jail). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 433–34 (discussing how two of the three courts acting in 1980 and 1993 sanctioned the 
power of the government to criminalize suspicion of public drug-related activity in the form of a loiter-
ing crime). 
 74. Johnson v. Athens-Clarke County, 529 S.E.2d 613, 613 (Ga. 2000). 
 75. See generally People v. Garcia, 23 P.3d 590 (Cal. 2001) (subjective suspicion); Wright v. Supe-
rior Court, 936 P.2d 101 (Cal. 1997) (subjective suspicion); Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 761 A.2d 705 
(Conn. 2000) (reasonable suspicion); State v. Klein, 698 N.E.2d 296 (Ind. 1998); Smith v. City of 
Picayune, 701 So. 2d 1101 (Miss. 1997) (subjective suspicion); State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio 
1998); Commonwealth v. Killinger, 888 A.2d 592 (Pa. 2005) (implicit subjective suspicion); State v. 
Milette, 727 A.2d 1236 (R.I. 1999) (reasonable suspicion); State v. Mendez, 970 P.2d 722, 729 (Wash. 
2000); Sale v. City of Charleston, 539 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 2000); In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712 (Wis. 
2001) (reasonable suspicion); State v. Griffith, 613 N.W.2d 72 (Wis. 2000). 
 76. See Griffith, 613 N.W.2d at 84 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (discussing a police officer who without 
any basis asked a black male backseat passenger for identification). 
 77. Mendez, 970 P.2d at 729–30. 
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B. State Supreme Courts: Post-September 11th 
Since September 11, 2001, eleven courts—Alaska, California, Dela-
ware, Florida, Hawaii, Maryland, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, and Pennsylvania—in fourteen decisions, have expressly 
or by implication sanctioned the constitutionality of criminalization based 
on suspicion.
78
  In California, Maryland, and New Hampshire, the courts 
even sanctioned expressly or by implication the right of criminalization 
based on subjective suspicion.
79
 
On the other hand, five state supreme courts—Massachusetts, Nevada, 
Washington, and two courts which also sanctioned suspicion-based crimi-
nalization during the same period, Florida and Maryland—in five deci-
sions, expressly or by implication prohibited the government from crimina-
lizing even reasonable suspicion.
80
  The Maryland court held that the gov-
ernment cannot constitutionally search a person or his effects based on 
reasonable suspicion, and therefore is also prohibited from criminalizing 




 78. See generally Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252 (Alaska 2004); People v. 
Sorden, 113 P.3d 565 (Cal. 2005); People v. Barker, 96 P.3d 507 (Cal. 2004) (finding no violation of 
due process to criminalize failure to re-register as a sex offender); Carter v. State, 814 A.2d 443 (Del. 
2002); State v. Baez, 894 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2005); State v. Barros, 48 P.3d 584 (Haw. 2002); Byndloss 
v. State, 893 A.2d 1119 (Md. 2006); State v. Wardell, 122 P.3d 443 (Mont. 2005); State v. Bear, 106 
822 A.2d 562 (N.H. 2003); State v. Bryant, 614 S.E.2d 479 (N.C. 2005); Killinger, 888 A.2d at 594; 
Commonwealth v. Ickes, 873 A.2d 698 (Pa. 2005). 
 79. See, e.g., Barker, 96 P.3d at 507; Byndloss, 893 A.2d at 1121 (stating that government agents, 
after stopping a vehicle for a possible traffic violation, can continue to seize all of the occupants of that 
vehicle, even if the only reason for the stop was resolved, for an additional twenty minutes based solely 
on the agent‘s subjective suspicion, and can demand that all occupants provide identification, and run 
registration, license, and warrant checks—which means, of course, that a refusal to comply with any of 
these sanctioned government investigative techniques could be criminalized by the Maryland state 
legislature); State v. Porelle, 822 A.2d 562, 566 (N.H. 2003) (finding no violation of due process va-
gueness doctrine in criminalizing merely following another person in violation of a protective order). 
 80. See generally State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 2005) (criminalizing statuses of juvenile and or 
parent/guardian if the juvenile left home even with parents permission after the curfew hour); Swift v. 
State, 899 A.2d 867 (Md. 2006) (requiring reasonable suspicion after finding that the original encounter 
which precipitated the events that led to the arrest was a stop where an officer had only subjective 
suspicion at the time he began the encounter, and eventually arrested the accused for an unidentified 
crime, subsequently finding contraband drugs and an illegal gun after a result of a search incident to the 
illegal arrest); Commonwealth v. Carkhuff, 804 N.E.2d 317, 323 (Mass. 2004) (prohibiting criminaliza-
tion based on sanctioning the government investigatory technique of stopping all cars without individu-
alized suspicion); Silvar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 P.3d 682, 684 (Nev. 2006) (finding prohibi-
tion of loitering for purpose of prostitution unconstitutionally vague and overbroad); City of Sumner v. 
Walsh, 61 P.3d 1111 (Wash. 2003) (prohibiting criminalization of legislative subjective suspicion of 
juveniles and their parents, even though ordinance only provided for civil sanctions, which would apply 
even more if criminal sanctions were imposed by ordinance). 
 81. Swift, 899 A.2d at 873. 
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C. Crimes based on Lying to Government Agents 
When the government or its agent ―encounters‖ a person based only on 
subjective suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is 
about to commit a crime, any decision by the legislature to criminalize any 
lie the person tells in response to the government‘s questions is the crimi-
nalization of suspicion.  A democratic government, with no interests at 
stake except its own self-aggrandizement, has no justification for demand-
ing that a person so encountered tell the truth or risk the loss of liberty.  In 
2001, the Michigan court held that a lie in such circumstances could not be 
criminalized as obstruction of justice.
82
  A year earlier, the Georgia court 
likewise held that vagrancy and loitering crimes violate due process when 
they are employed to serve their historical purpose of allowing government 
agents to round up those they suspect of some other crime, even if those 
suspected are uncooperative and untruthful with the government agent.
83
 
D. Stop-and-Identify Crimes 
As documented in Part II, almost all stop-and-identify statutes open the 
door to criminalization based on suspicion because they seek to justify a 
government seizure and permit government investigatory techniques that 
piggyback on that seizure—based solely on, at most, reasonable suspi-
cion—and almost all criminalize the refusal of a citizen to provide identifi-
cation.
84
  Less than nineteen months before September 11, 2001, the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court prohibited the executive branch from relying solely 
on an agent‘s subjective suspicion to seize a person and then criminalize 
the person based on what was thereafter discovered by investigative tech-
niques.
85
  Additionally, that same court analyzed a large array of judicial 
precedents, from both state and federal courts, to support its contention that 
state and federal constitutional search and seizure protections prohibit the 
government from obtaining the identification of citizens to pursue investi-
gations based only on the subjective suspicion of its agents.
86
  The Tennes-
see and Wisconsin courts, however, impliedly held that a polite but racist, 
sexist, or just plain sadistic government agent could pursue his prejudices 
or merely subjective suspicions to ―encounter‖ any citizen in any public 
  
 82. People v. Vasquez, 631 N.W.2d 711, 718 (Mich. 2001).  But see 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006) (pro-
viding criminal penalties for ―mak[ing] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or repre-
sentation‖ while ―within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Govern-
ment‖). 
 83. See Johnson v. Athens-Clarke County, 529 S.E.2d 613, 616 (Ga. 2000). 
 84. See supra Part II.E and accompanying notes. 
 85. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 428 (Tenn. 2000). 
 86. Id. at 427–28. 
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place, even in a seized motor vehicle, and request that the citizen identify 
himself or provide identification documents.
87
  While these courts did not 
claim that a consensus of appellate courts had sanctioned the grant of this 
power to government agents, they did suggest that standards developed to 
evaluate the constitutionality of employing such investigative techniques 
during an encounter gave little or no significance to the fact that the gov-
ernment had no interests at risk.
88
 
Since September 11th, the supreme courts of Florida, Iowa, Michigan, 
Nevada, and Pennsylvania have held expressly or implicitly that the gov-
ernment, acting without reasonable suspicion, can request in a public place 
that any citizen provide identification.
89
  The Pennsylvania court, however, 
expressly held that it violates federal and arguably state constitutional 
standards for the government to criminalize a person‘s refusal to comply 
with such a request.
90
  These courts have held that subjective suspicion—
despite the fact that it per se means that no governmental interests are at 
risk—is enough to justify the government agent‘s retention of an identifi-
cation document and its use to run a warrant check.  Thereafter, the Flori-
da, Iowa, and Michigan courts held that the government may arrest, prose-
cute, and convict the citizen based on information provided by the citizen, 
failure of the citizen to provide information sought, information learned 
during that encounter, or from a warrant check.
91
  In Iowa, the court rea-
soned that a government agent‘s request for a citizen‘s official government 
identification, and a check with other government agents to determine if 
the citizen had an outstanding arrest warrant, was not a seizure because this 
investigatory technique was ―no more intrusive‖ than simply asking the 
citizen to answer a question during such a public encounter.
92
  The court 
did not address the crucial interests-reconciliation issue of whether the 
citizen remained free to demand return of his identification upon learning 
or simply believing that the agent intended to use it to run a warrant check.  
On the other hand, the Michigan court held that if a citizen seeks to leave 
while the warrant check is being conducted, there is significant evidence to 
  
 87. See id. at 426–27; Griffith, 613 N.W.2d at 84. 
 88. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d at 426 (listing several factors all focusing on the attitude, behavior, and 
communications of government agents once the agent begins the encounter); State v. Griffith, 613 
N.W.2d 72, 84 (Wis. 2000). 
 89. See State v. Baez, 894 So. 2d 115, 115 (Fla. 2004) (discussing the court‘s restatement of its 1983 
holding in the Lightbourne case); State v. Smith, 683 N.W.2d 542, 548 (Iowa 2004); People v. Jenkins, 
691 N.W.2d 759, 764 (Mich. 2005); Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201 (Nev. 2002); 
Ickes, 873 A.2d at 701. 
 90. Ickes, 873 A.2d at 701–02 (stating that the right to refuse request is expressly characterized as a 
right and therefore non-criminal behavior). 
 91. See Baez, 894 So. 2d at 115 (discussing the court‘s restatement of its 1983 holding in the 
Lightbourne case); Smith, 683 N.W.2d at 548; Jenkins, 691 N.W.2d at 764. 
 92. Smith, 683 N.W.2d at 547–48. 
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justify a conclusion that there is reasonable suspicion that the citizen must 
be guilty of some unspecified crime at some unspecified time, thereby 
helping to justify the government‘s subsequent seizure of that citizen.93   In 
Pennsylvania, citing Hiibel, the court held that not only does it not violate 
the U.S. Constitution, it also does not apparently violate its state constitu-
tion to criminalize the refusal of a citizen to provide identification, if the 
demanding government agent has reasonable suspicion that an unspecified 
crime may have been committed.
94
 
E. ―Status‖ Crimes 
1. Sex-Offender Registration and Crimes based on Refusal to Register 
One of the most significant trends in the last dozen years involving the 
state supreme courts‘ sanctioning the criminalization of suspicion is their 
upholding the legality of sex-offender-registration status crimes.
95
  This 
trend is arguably inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Lambert v. California.
96
  Statutes which criminalize the status of an ―ex-
felony-sex-offender,‖ coupled with the innocuous omission of failing to 
register or re-register that status, criminalize based on a legislature‘s pur-
portedly reasonable but in reality subjective suspicion.  Hence, a person‘s 
liberty can be taken absent a scintilla of individualized proof that he is like-
ly to have committed or is in the process of committing the same crime 
again. 
In the six years prior to September 11th, the California and Ohio courts 
sanctioned the constitutionality of criminalizing legislative subjective sus-
picion by upholding the right of the government to make it a crime—and 
even a felony—to have the status of an ex-sex-crime-felon coupled with a 
failure to register or re-register that status.
97
  Since September 11th, the 
  
 93. Jenkins, 691 N.W.2d at 764. 
 94. Ickes, 873 A.2d at 701. 
 95. See generally People v. Barker, 96 P.3d 507 (Cal. 2004) (felony crime); Wright v. Superior 
Court, 936 P.2d 101 (Cal. 1997); State v. Bryant, 614 S.E.2d 479 (N.C. 2005); Commonwealth v. 
Killinger, 888 A.2d 592, 595 (Pa. 2005) (accusing convicted person of a remedial measure treated as a 
felony despite the fact that he merely lived in the city in which he had already registered for less than 
two months before reporting moving to another address in the same city); State v. Knowles, 643 
N.W.2d 20, 22 (N.D. 2002) (involving failure to register or re-register a class A misdemeanor, and 
imposing a non-waivable mandatory minimum of ninety days imprisonment on all those convicted 
except juveniles). 
 96. 355 U.S. 225, 22930 (1958) (holding that registration provisions violated due process when 
applied to a person who had no actual knowledge of her duty to register); see also supra notes 3031 
and accompanying text. 
 97. People v. Garcia, 23 P.3d 590, 590 (Cal. 2001); Wright, 936 P.2d at 102; State v. Cook, 700 
N.E.2d 570, 575 (Ohio 1998). 
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California, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania 
courts, in seven decisions, did the same.
98
 
In North Carolina, the court‘s sanctioning of the constitutionality of 
criminalizing an ex-sex-offender‘s failure to register or re-register that sta-
tus, has endorsed enhancing the government‘s interests justifying such 
crimes, despite the fact that the basis for such enhancement was data sub-
ject to unilateral manipulation by the government.
99
  The data demonstrat-
ed a higher frequency of re-arrest for ex-sex-offenders in comparison to 
those convicted of other crimes; but the registration regime, imposed na-
tionally, significantly heightens the likelihood of such re-arrest.  The re-
arrests are, in this cycle of circular reasoning, the primary empirical justifi-
cation for the registration regime.
100
 
The California and North Carolina supreme courts, in sanctioning the 
criminalization of an ex-sex-offender‘s willful failure to register or re-
register that status, also implicitly further empowered the government by 
permitting an accused to be convicted based on strict liability for that fail-
ure.
101
  Since such ex-felons have a status that makes them inherently sus-
pect in the collective subjective belief of the legislature, the government is 
empowered to keep track of them at all times and criminalize—even as a 
felony—their inadvertent failure register or re-register.  This is true even if 
multiple government agencies know of the ex-sexual-offender‘s residence 
at that point in time, and even if the ultimate sentence could be substantial-
ly enhanced because the new status conviction makes the accused a reci-
divist felon.
102
  Criminalizing on the basis of inherently suspicious status 
  
 98. People v. Sorden, 113 P.3d 565, 568 (Cal. 2005); Barker, 96 P.3d at 507; State v. Wardell, 122 
P.3d 443, 443 (Mont. 2005); Bryant, 614 S.E.2d at 479; Knowles, 643 N.W.2d at 22; Killinger, 888 
A.2d at 594. 
 99. Bryant, 614 S.E.2d at 479. 
 100. Id. at 482 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 14071–72 (2000) (codifying the policy of conditioning funding to 
states for law enforcement on passage of sex offender registration laws)). 
 101. See Sorden, 113 P.3d at 568–69 (finding that the accused knew of his duty to re-register, and the 
government did not have to prove any level of culpability of the accused at the times he failed in his 
duty); Barker, 96 P.3d at 515; Bryant, 614 S.E.2d at 484 (The court made a gross conceptual error of 
excusing the decision of the legislature to eliminate any level of culpability by characterizing the regis-
tration regime as regulatory, but completely ignoring that the regime culminated with a criminal prose-
cution for a felony, and failing to identify any other regulatory regime in North Carolina which in-
cluded a strict liability felony.  The court also failed to counter long policy history by the supreme court 
of limiting strict liability to offenses which penalized without any possible jail time or only a short 
possible period of jail time.).  But see State v. Tippett, 624 N.W.2d 176, 178 (Iowa 2001) (stating that 
criminal convictions for failure to register or re-register can only be based on proof of a voluntary and 
intentional failure to perform a known legal duty); Knowles, 643 N.W.2d at 24 (employing statutory 
interpretation analysis to conclude that failure to register or re-register crime was not a strict liability 
offense). 
 102. See Barker, 96 P.3d at 515; Garcia, 23 P.3d at 598 (upholding application of California‘s ―three 
strike‖ sentencing enhancement scheme based solely on the failure to register as a sex offender); War-
dell, 122 P.3d at 447 (recognizing that such statutes criminalize status and sanctioning that the failure-
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means criminalizing everyone who has that status, even if the basis for it 
occurred a quarter of a century ago.
103
  The California Supreme Court has 
unwittingly admitted that the government has no real interests at risk to 
justify such criminalization, by acknowledging that a prior sex offender 
can constitutionally be convicted of a felony for not registering or re-
registering—even where that the government at all times knew of his local 
residence, the accused had registered and re-registered for over a decade, 
and the failure to register or re-register was de minimis.
104
 
Most of these state supreme court decisions sanctioning the criminaliz-
ing of sex offenders‘ failure to register or re-register have balanced the 
interest assessment described above by holding that these crimes are con-
stitutional only if read to be an exception to the principle that ignorance of 
the law is no excuse.
105
  Accordingly, for the government to convict, it 
must prove that the accused actually knew of his duty to register or re-
register, or there was a basis for concluding the accused was probably 
aware of that legal duty.
106
  The California court relied on the U.S. Consti-
tution‘s due process protection as the basis for requiring the accused to 
have known or have had reason to know of his duty to register.
107
  Also, 
the court has interpreted the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lambert 
as imposing this national standard.
108
  Since September 11th, however, the 
North Carolina court has sought to skirt the Lambert limitation or question 
its continuing viability in the context of sex-offender-registration crimes.
109
 
Even more disturbing was the incredible conceptual confusion in a re-
cent holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which sanctioned the 
constitutionality of restoring a criminal prosecution for failure to register 
by apparently approving the constitutionality of a subsequent conviction 
factually decided by a judge and based on a standard of review that was 
less than proof beyond reasonable doubt.
110
  This court‘s recent history of 
  
to-register felony crime can then be recycled as the sole basis for triggering additional years of impri-
sonment under the state‘s persistent felony offender scheme). 
 103. Barker, 96 P.3d at 515. 
 104. Sorden, 113 P.3d at 567–69 (sanctioning the constitutionality of prosecution and conviction for 
failure to re-register where the accused was required to re-register within five days of his birthday, 
voluntarily came into register sixteen days after his birthday, and the state knew of his current address 
at all times). 
 105. Garcia, 23 P.3d at 596. 
 106. Id. at 595. 
 107. Sorden, 113 P.3d at 568. 
 108. Id.; Garcia, 23 P.3d at 595. 
 109. See State v. Bryant, 614 S.E.2d 479, 48788 (N.C. 2005) (offering an unconvincing recitation of 
authority to justify that the subsequent limiting of the Lambert assertion was unnecessary in light of the 
fact that the accused had apparently received actual written notice by South Carolina of the need to re-
register if his move into the new county was an out-of-state move (to North Carolina), as well as notify 
the county in South Carolina where he previously lived). 
 110. Commonwealth v. Killinger, 888 A.2d 592, 60001 (Pa. 2005). 
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sanctioning the constitutionality of criminalizing the refusal of sex offend-
ers to register or re-register demonstrates an ultimate danger in a maturing 
democracy of criminalization based on the subjective suspicion of the leg-
islature.  Interest identification, evaluation, and reconciliation are skewed 
to the point of tyranny.  The government could sentence such offenders to 
long original terms of imprisonment, but in these cases fails to ―protect‖ 
the public by employment of this unassailable policy decision.  It could 
subject each offender upon release to a continuing period of supervision, 
and make the failure to register or re-register an express term of release or 
the granting of probation, further subjecting a violator to another term of 
imprisonment upon failure to comply.  Either of these policies provides 
complete public protection without resort to creating a new crime based on 
subjective suspicion of future crimes.  When the accused has engaged in no 
anti-social behavior, further piling on strict liability or treating the ―new‖ 
offense as a separate felony can trigger dire sentencing consequences. 
2. Gang Crimes 
Criminalization of ―criminal gangs‖ or members of such gangs are at-
tempts to criminalize suspicion.  In Illinois, the court has justified this de-
cision on the government‘s subjective suspicion that such persons are al-
ways likely to have committed, be committing, or be about to commit 
some future crime.
111
  In Pennsylvania, the court sanctioned use as a signif-
icant factor to justify, not just reasonable suspicion, but probable cause to 
search a vehicle, identifying an individual as a member of a dangerous 
gang.
112
  Implications of dangerous gang membership justified a search of 
a vehicle for illegal weapons.
113
  Once the state supreme court sanctions 
the constitutionality of such a search, justified primarily by subjective sus-
picion of gang status, the legislature can criminalize any failure to coope-
rate with the search procedure. 
3. Terrorist Crimes 
In the six years prior to September 11th, there were no state supreme 
courts which decided the constitutionality of criminalizing the status of 
―terrorist.‖  Since September 11th, the Massachusetts court has prohibited 
the government from criminalization based on subjective suspicion, even 
  
 111. City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 58 (Ill. 1997). 
 112. Killinger, 888 A.2d at 600–01. 
 113. Id. 
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when there was a direct reference by the state to terrorism and terrorist as a 
primary justification for a seizure executed without an evidentiary basis.
114
 
4. Juvenile Curfew Crimes 
Juvenile curfew crimes are among the most widespread current exam-
ples of criminalization based upon the subjective suspicion of a legislature.  
These crimes criminalize subjective suspicion because they criminalize an 
innocuous status, age, and circumstance, such as leaving one‘s home after 
a certain time when the person has not reached a certain age.  Legislatures 
that enact such crimes are only criminalizing their subjective suspicion that 
the location of juveniles in public in the late evening hours creates a risk 
that some unspecified other crime might be committed by or upon such 
juveniles.
115
  Anecdotal evidence, statistics, and heuristics are often cited 
as the basis for this suspicion.
116
  Many of these juvenile curfew crimes 
also criminalize the status of the parent or guardian of these juveniles, such 
as a parent‘s acquiescence or failure to prevent his child from leaving 
home after the curfew begins.
117
  These youth curfew crimes, however, 
omit as an element any specific conduct, circumstances, or result that 
would serve as relevant evidence that the commission of any crime is im-
minent. 
Prior to September 11th, courts in Connecticut and West Virginia held 
it was constitutional for local legislatures to enact, enforce, and eventually 
criminalize a juvenile curfew.
118
  Since September 11th, the supreme courts 
of Alaska and Florida have addressed the constitutionality of such curfew 
crimes under the federal as well as state constitutions.  In Alaska, the court 
sanctioned the constitutionality of the legislature‘s criminalization of age 
  
 114. Commonwealth v. Carkhuff, 804 N.E.2d 317, 323 (Mass. 2004) (finding that a seizure without 
evidence of individual suspicion may be justified, providing there is adequate administrative authoriza-
tion and guidelines which limit the intrusion on the liberty interests of many law abiding citizens). 
 115. See City of Sumner v. Walsh, 61 P.3d 1111, 111617 (Wash. 2003) (stating that the practical 
effect of a juvenile curfew ordinance was to sanction any juvenile who is found in public for any rea-
son, leaving it to police to determine the narrow range of situations when in fact an arrest and prosecu-
tion is justified).  The court went further by then expressly asserting that it was constitutional for the 
government to seize persons they suspected of this subjective suspicion status crime.  Id. 
 116. See generally Sale v. City of Charleston, 539 S.E.2d 446, 456 (W. Va. 2000) (relying on trial 
evidence provided by the city tending to show that the crime rate dropped when juvenile curfews were 
enacted by other cities).  Crime rates would necessarily drop for all public place crimes if all citizens 
were ordered to stay in after a certain hour. 
 117. Id. at 450 (punishing parents with a maximum sentence of thirty days in jail, but subjecting the 
youth only to juvenile authority). 
 118. Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 761 A.2d 705, 710 (Conn. 2000); Sale, 539 S.E.2d at 446. 
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status based on subjective suspicion.  In Florida, however, the court prohi-
bited criminalization based on such legislative subjective suspicion.
119
 
The courts relied on anecdotal evidence, arrest as opposed to convic-
tion statistics, conclusory findings of fact, presumptions, or merely con-
jured an array of state interests.
120
  The Alaska Supreme Court sanctioned 
the constitutionality of the juvenile curfew crime despite the fact that at the 
moment of every actual arrest or subsequent conviction which is based 
solely on that crime, the government has no interests threatened or injured 
by an innocent status combined with innocent conduct.  This lack of gov-
ernment interests is the reality every time a government seeks to criminal-
ize based solely on subjective suspicion.
121
  Turning a blind eye to this 
reality, both of the state supreme courts reviewing the constitutionality of 
juvenile curfew crimes after September 11th have concluded that the gov-




The Florida court also acknowledged that these curfew crimes injure 
such fundamental federal or state constitutional rights as the right to 
movement and privacy.
123
  The Florida court reconciled these competing 
important interests, first by partially recognizing the principle asserted at 
the beginning of this subsection that these juvenile curfew crimes criminal-
ize innocent status and conduct.
124
  Second, the court gave great signific-
ance to the principle that these interests are fairly reconciled by eliminating 
the power of the government to enact juvenile curfew laws to criminalize 
as that term is defined in this article.
125
  The court expressly recognized 
that potentially criminalizing any juvenile who merely appears in public 
after the curfew hour is ―antithetical‖ to the curfew‘s purported goal of 
protecting juveniles, and even noted that one of the cities was willing to 





 119. See Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252, 265 (Alaska 2004) (finding the govern-
ment‘s interests in criminalizing juveniles ―compelling‖); State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1101 (Fla. 
2005); see also City of Sumner v. Walsh, 61 P.3d at 1117 (holding unconstitutional a juvenile curfew 
statute that imposed only civil sanctions). 
 120. See Treacy, 91 P.3d at 265; J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1116–17. 
 121. See Treacy, 91 P.3d at 265; J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1116–17. 
 122. Treacy, 91 P.3d at 269; J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1117. 
 123. J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1115–16. 
 124. Id. at 1118. 
 125. Id. at 1118–19 (pointing out, regarding two city ordinances under review, that both juveniles and 
parents can be jailed for violating the curfew crime a second time, even though the model curfew act, 
adopted by the Florida legislature, is civil and authorizes no imprisonment). 
 126. Id. at 1119 (reviewing prior cases sanctioning the constitutionality of juvenile curfew laws 
involving civil rather than criminal sanctions). 
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The decisions of three of these four courts which upheld the constitu-
tionality of the legislatures‘ decisions to criminalize this innocent status 
and circumstance were made despite the fact that in at least four decisions, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has held expressly or by implication that crimina-
lization based solely on status, or status coupled with otherwise completely 
innocuous conduct, violates the federal constitution.
127
  Curfew criminali-
zation based on subjective suspicion, like the stop-and-identify crime 
charged in Hiibel, highlights a legislative drafting lesson that the vague-
ness constitutional challenge can be combated through broader criminaliza-
tion based on reasonable suspicion of some crime while ensuring that a 
crime‘s definition clearly identifies an innocuous status or conduct.128 
5. Loitering Crimes 
Criminalization of loitering is the criminalization of lingering in pub-
lic, which by itself is a completely harmless course of conduct, and one 
protected against criminalization by the U.S. Constitution.
129
  Therefore, 
the criminalization of loitering by itself is an unconstitutional deprivation 
of liberty.  Accordingly, almost all current loitering statutes combine pub-
lic lingering with what the government perceives to be a sinister motive, 
suspicious status, or sinister circumstance as the basis for the crime.
130
  All 
three combinations, however, merely involve a constitutionally impermiss-
ible deprivation of liberty coupled with subjective suspicion based upon a 
person‘s thoughts, status, or unspecified circumstance.  These combina-
tions, therefore, all violate both the U.S. Constitution‘s due process and 
cruel and unusual punishment protections.
131
  These unconstitutional com-
binations cannot be saved by the government posting a sign or assigning an 
agent to assert that loitering is forbidden, and then criminalizing the refusal 
to obey the sign or agent.  For example, post-September 11th, a Delaware 
court inferentially sanctioned criminalization based on such a govern-
  
 127. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 128. See infra notes 203–08 and accompanying text. 
 129. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 60 (Ill. 1997) (stating that a person may know 
the meaning of ―loiter,‖ but may not understand based on that definition why his loitering was the basis 
for criminalization); see also supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 130. See 91 C.J.S. Vagrancy and Related Offenses § 32 (2008). 
 131. See generally Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 58 (discussing groups lingering in public, and finding that 
one group is also a member of a criminal street gang); Silvar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 P.3d 
682, 687 (Nev. 2006); see also supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.  The Constitution prohibits 
criminalizing a person‘s thoughts of committing a crime when unaccompanied by any conduct that is 
even mildly corroborative of that criminal purpose.  But see 77 AM. JUR. 2D Vagrancy and Related 
Offenses § 3 (2008). 
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ment‘s self-aggrandizing power ploy.132  In reality, all three combinations 
seek criminalization based on legislative subjective suspicion.
133
  Com-
mentators recognize that loitering crimes often sanction skirting the consti-
tutionally mandated proof standard of probable cause to arrest, but often 
fail to recognize the much more egregious constitutional violation.
134
  Such 
loitering statutes authorize not just arrest but conviction based on mere 
suspicion of an unspecified other crime. 
Prior to September 11th, the Illinois, Georgia, and Louisiana supreme 
courts prohibited their state legislatures from criminalizing loitering or 
lingering in public, when the rationale of the criminalization decisions was 
reasonable suspicion that at least one person participating in the lingering 
has a per se suspicious status, or at least one such person was about to en-
gage or had just engaged in drug-related activity.
135
  Post-September 11th, 
the Nevada high court also prohibited the state legislature from criminaliz-
ing loitering or lingering in public because the legislature‘s primary ratio-
nale of the criminalization was based on the subjective suspicion of a 
crime.
136
  On the other hand, the Delaware high court decided, by implica-
tion, that even without reasonable suspicion the government can define a 
loitering crime to include the criminalization of a refusal to comply with a 
command that the citizen move on from a public street.
137
 
Loitering and vagrancy crimes are among the most enduring examples 
of American governments criminalizing based on suspicion.
138
   Ironically, 
even the Model Penal Code—the icon of criminal law reform—adopted a 
  
 132. Carter v. State, 814 A.2d 443, 445 (Del. 2002) (expressly acknowledging that at no time did the 
government have probable cause to arrest the accused for any crime).  Police thought accused might be 
street drug dealer, but did not observe any transactions.  Id.  Therefore there was no basis for proving 
even a reasonable suspicion of a crime; yet the court assumed officers had authority to order the ac-
cused to move from the area, and if he failed to do so—in this case he did comply with this first com-
mand—this would have given the agents probable cause to arrest, and seemingly prosecute and convict 
on that provision of the loitering statute.  Id.  This was so, in spite of the fact that the crime definition 
required that the government agent‘s order to move must be lawful, but the state supreme court made 
no reference to this circumstantial element which limited the scope of the crime.  Id. 
 133. Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 58 (discussing how the City Council claimed that gang membership and 
loitering created a justifiable fear); Silvar, 129 P.3d at 687; see also Jordan Berns, Is There Something 
Suspicious About the Constitutionality of Loitering Laws?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 717, 718 (1989) (asserting 
that as originally adopted in the United States, loitering crimes were enacted to thwart the potential of 
the idle poor to commit crimes). 
 134. See Berns, supra note 133, at 724, 733–34. 
 135. See generally Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 58 (criminal street gang member); Johnson v. Athens 
Clarke County, 529 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2000) (drug related activity); State v. Muschkat, 706 So. 2d 429 
(La. 1998) (drug related activity). 
 136. Silvar, 129 P.3d at 689. 
 137. Carter, 814 A.2d at 445 (stating that since the police only thought the accused might be street 
drug dealer, but did not observe any transactions, there was no basis for proving even a reasonable 
suspicion of a crime). 
 138. See Berns, supra note 133, at 718. 
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loitering crime that sanctioned criminalization based on suspicion.
139
  Con-
sequently, several states have adopted revised penal codes with loitering 
crimes mimicking the Model Penal Code, which authorize criminalization 
based only on suspicion.
140
 
The precedents of the last dozen years, however, provide some indica-
tion that current state supreme courts—in contrast to an earlier U.S. Su-
preme Court, commentators, and state supreme courts adopting the U.S. 
Supreme Court‘s reasoning—are more likely to reject the constitutionality 
of these loitering crimes.  In addition, these current courts are also more 
likely to reject the principle that the insertion of a mens rea element, par-
ticularly the inherently ambiguous old common law concept of ―specific 
intent‖ or even ―purpose‖ as defined in modern codes, is a significant fac-
tor boosting the constitutionality of such loitering crimes.
141
  These current 
courts thereby recognize the reality that a person‘s purpose cannot be de-
termined by his lingering in public, nor can a person‘s objective, if any, be 
discerned by the time of day at which the lingering takes place—and in-
serting in the crime‘s definition words such as ―suspicious circumstances‖ 




6. Disorderly Conduct Statutes 
Disorderly conduct crimes sometimes include provisions which, as in-
terpreted by state supreme courts, sanction criminalization based on the 
subjective suspicion of a government agent or the legislature that a crime 
might take place.
143
  For example, one state supreme court recently held 
that disorderly conduct can be constitutionally criminalized based on only 
a police officer‘s subjective belief that the accused is suspicious where, 
after an encounter was initiated, the suspect cursed at the officer and in-
quired why he was being harassed.
144
  Of course, if a person who was not a 
government agent acted on the same subjective suspicion, his action would 
be characterized not as an encounter, but as a confrontation, and the person 
confronted would be justified in cursing and inquiring about the reason for 
the confrontation.  When encounters based solely on subjective suspicion 
  
 139. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (1985). 
 140. See Berns, supra note 133, at 727–30. 
 141. See Berns, supra note 133, at 730–35; supra note 132 and accompanying text.  
 142. See supra notes 72, 130–31, and accompanying text. 
 143. Johnson v. State, 37 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Ark. 2001) (involving a government agent‘s subjective 
suspicion); Smith v. City of Picayune, 701 So. 2d 1101 (Miss. 1997) (dealing with a government 
agent‘s subjective suspicion); In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712, 717 (Wis. 2001) (involving the state legisla-
ture‘s subjective suspicion). 
 144. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d at 192–93. 
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were first sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court, its primary—if not on-
ly—rationale was that a government agent, like any other person, should 
be allowed to attempt to engage another person in conversation in the same 
public space—but such an agent runs the same risk as any other person, in 




Three state supreme courts, in the six years prior to September 11th, 
sanctioned the constitutionality of criminalizing legislative subjective sus-
picion found in definitions of the crime of disorderly conduct.
146
  In sanc-
tioning the power of the government to criminalize suspicion via a defini-
tion of disorderly conduct, two state supreme courts shortly before Sep-
tember 11th were willing to subordinate an express constitutional right—
speech—to the power of the government, in the criminalization of a verbal 
threat of multiple homicides to be committed at some unspecified time in 
the future, without requiring that the elements of the crime, as interpreted, 




IV.  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS & REFORM PROPOSALS: PERSPECTIVES & 
CONCLUSION 
A. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Position Over Time Regarding the Constitu-
tionality of Criminalizing Suspicion 
The Hiibel decision was a substantial departure from the U.S. Supreme 
Court‘s precedents that had rejected the constitutionality of criminalizing 
suspicion.
148
  In fact, the decision marks only the second time in the 
Court‘s history when it signaled its willingness to sanction criminalization 
based on only subjective suspicion.
149
  The first time—the infamous and 
yet to be expressly repudiated Korematsu decision—was also made in the 
wake of a major ―terrorist‖ attack.150  In addition, the Nevada Supreme 
Court, in reaching the same decision in Hiibel as the U.S. Supreme Court, 
  
 145. See cases cited supra note 13.  The author‘s principal conceptual thesis and evaluation is that a 
circumstance—the character of a neighborhood, when asserted by the government to be one high in the 
incidence of crime—while relevant arguably to a determination of reasonable suspicion, should not be 
a factor upon which to significantly base a finding of reasonable suspicion absent specific evidence 
based on the behavior of the particular suspect.  See Raymond, supra note 15. 
 146. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d at 191; Smith v. City of Picayune, 701 So. 2d 1101, 1101 (Miss. 1997); In 
re A.S., 626 N.W.2d at 712. 
 147. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d at 194–95; In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d at 720. 
 148. See supra Part II.A. 
 149. See supra notes 2830 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra notes 19–20, 23 and accompanying text. 
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justified its decision in part by reliance upon the September 11th attack.
151
  
In combination, these two facts are circumstantial evidence that the attack 
might well have influenced the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 
Hiibel decision.  Since that 2004 decision, the Court has not revisited the 




B. Summarizing Outcomes of State Supreme Court Decisions on the Con-
stitutionality of Criminalizing Suspicion Pre- & Post-September 11th, 
& Perspectives Including Core Null Hypotheses 
In the six years immediately preceding September 11, 2001, a majority 
of state supreme courts which had considered the matter (ten of seventeen), 
in a majority of decisions (twelve of nineteen), sanctioned the constitutio-
nality of criminalizing suspicion.
153
  In the six years immediately following 
September 11, 2001, a majority of state supreme courts (eleven of sixteen), 
in a majority of decisions (fourteen of nineteen), sanctioned the constitu-
tionality of criminalizing suspicion.
154
  In addition, thirteen state supreme 
courts have cited the Supreme Court‘s Hiibel decision.155  Seven of these 
courts cited Hiibel favorably, and only one seemed, by implication, to dis-
agree with the Court‘s assessment of the government‘s interest at stake 




This means that in the last dozen years, almost half of the state su-
preme courts (twenty-three), and over two-thirds of the state supreme 
courts this article identified as faced with the choice, sanctioned the crimi-
nalization of suspicion—although five supreme courts sanctioned in one or 
more cases, and prohibited in one or more cases.  Hence, this article‘s pri-
mary inquiry—whether the nation‘s highest appellate courts were, on bal-
ance, more willing to acquiesce in criminalization based on suspicion in 
the six years following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pen-
tagon—must be answered, tentatively, ―no‖ for the state supreme courts.  
Based on the Hiibel decision, however, the tentative answer is ―yes.‖ 
  
 151. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Nev. 2002). 
 152. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra notes 68, 75, and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 78, 80, and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text. 
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C. Federalism Findings & Their Impact on the Constitutionality of Crimi-
nalizing Suspicion 
Whether it is currently constitutional in America to criminalize based 
on subjective or objective suspicion depends not only upon the federal 
Constitution and its interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court, but also on 
state constitutions as interpreted by state supreme courts.  State supreme 
courts have the power to hold that rights guaranteed by their respective 
constitutions provide greater protection to individual rights than that pro-
vided by the federal Constitution.
157
  Hence, the question becomes, how 
willing are state supreme courts to interpret their respective constitutions to 
further limit criminalization based on suspicion?  The scorecard follows. 
In six cases, five state supreme courts during the period of this study, 
1995 through 2007, held that their constitutions provide no more protection 
of an express constitutional right than that provided by the federal Consti-
tution when these rights were asserted to challenge the direct or implied 
criminalization of suspicion.
158
  The Connecticut Supreme Court, for ex-
ample, held that while its state constitution could provide more protection 
than the federal Constitution, a Connecticut citizen claiming independent 
violation of a state constitutional right must prove that violation by satisfy-
ing the ultimate burden of persuasion standard: beyond a reasonable 
doubt.
159
  Similarly, the Maryland, Tennessee, and Wisconsin supreme 
courts construed their constitutions‘ search and seizure provisions to be 
identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment, therefore pro-
viding no more protection from government searches and seizures than that 
provided by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted 
by the U.S. Supreme Court.
160
  These courts fail to recognize that, taken 
  
 157. Neil Colman McCabe, State Constitutions and Substantive Criminal Law, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 
521, 526, 535–36 (1998) (referring to other authorities identifying state constitutional restrictions on 
criminalization and noting a longstanding tendency of state courts to place more limits than the federal 
courts on the power of the government to criminalize). 
 158. Byndloss v. State, 893 A.2d 1119, 1121 (Md. 2006); State v. Bryant, 614 S.E.2d 479, 485 (N.C. 
2005) (stating that unless expressly invoked by the accused, the court will apply the due process stan-
dards of the federal Constitution, although it reconfirmed the possibility that the state constitution‘s 
―Law of the Land‖ could be interpreted to provide more due process protection); Stave v. Daniel, 12 
S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tenn. 2000); City of Sumner v. Walsh, 61 P.3d 1111, 1114 n.5 (Wash. 2003) (stating 
that unless expressly briefed, the court will assume that the person making several constitutional chal-
lenges to  a juvenile curfew statute with civil sanctions was relying on the federal Constitution); In re 
A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712, 719 (Wis. 2001) (showing the Wisconsin constitution‘s protection of speech 
was no greater than that provided by First Amendment of the federal Constitution); State v. Griffith, 
613 N.W.2d 72, 77 n.10 (Wis. 2000). 
 159. Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 761 A.2d 705, 710, 717 (Conn. 2000) (holding that under this stan-
dard, the defendant failed multiple times to convince the court that several state constitutional protec-
tions were violated by a juvenile curfew crime). 
 160. Byndloss, 893 A.2d at 1121; Daniel, 12 S.W.3d at 424; Griffith, 613 N.W.2d at 77 n.10; see also 
State v. Klein, 698 N.E.2d 296, 299 (Ind. 1998) (stating that a failure to specifically make separate 
 
File: 02 Holley, pg. 39 - v7i1.doc Created on:  12/1/2008 3:16:00 PM Last Printed: 12/23/2008 6:19:00 PM 
72 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 7, No. 1 
literally, this assertion would negate the need for their comparable state 
provisions, unless the U.S. Constitution‘s Fourth Amendment was some-
how repealed or substantively amended to narrow its protection.  Most 
significantly for the focus of this article, these state supreme courts elimi-
nated the search-and-seizure provisions of their constitutions as a source to 
provide more protection against government criminalization of suspicion.  
On the other hand, five other state supreme courts during this most recent 
dozen years applied or presumed that their state constitution should be 
applied to a constitutional challenge of an express or implied criminaliza-
tion of suspicion first, in part because the state constitution could provide 
more protection than the U.S. Constitution‘s corresponding provision.161 
1. Curbing & Shrinking the Constitutionality of Criminalization of 
Suspicion: Identifying why the Supreme Courts Sanction the Consti-
tutionality of Criminalizing Suspicion, Reforming the Reasonable 
Suspicion Doctrine by Connecting it to Appropriate Standards of 
Substantive Criminal Law, & General Perspectives 
In the forty years since its invention by the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
reasonable suspicion proof standard has been drastically altered for the 
worse, altering the relationship between the liberty interests of American 
citizens and their governments.
162
  Most pertinent to this article‘s inquiry, 
is that the doctrine has played a major role in expanding the government‘s 
ability to criminalize based only on suspicion.
163
  Governments are empo-
wered by the Supreme Court, despite the absence of any specific constitu-
tional language or historical justifications, to seize citizens based on an 
ephemeral proof standard.  A standard which Justice Douglas, the lone 
dissenter in Terry, vehemently argued should only have been created and 
  
argument and precedent references results in waiver of the accused independent state constitutional 
claim that the criminalization was void for vagueness). 
 161. See State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1112 (Fla. 2005) (asserting that the state constitution‘s right 
of privacy ―embraces more privacy interests, and extends more protection to the individual in those 
interests, than does the federal Constitution‖ (citing In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989)); 
State v. Wardell, 122 P.3d 443, 446 (Mont. 2005); State v. Porelle, 822 A.2d 562, 565 (N.H. 2003) 
(regarding due process void for vagueness claim); State v. Mendez, 970 P.2d 722, 726 (Wash. 2000) 
(examining preeminence of the right of privacy under the state constitutional provision comparable to 
the Fourth Amendment); Sale v. Goldman, 539 S.E.2d 446, 458 (W. Va. 2000) (referencing—without 
discussing the minimum standards of the federal Constitution—only its own precedent establishing and 
articulating both its equal protection doctrine and due process void for vagueness doctrine). 
 162. Estrada, supra note 18, at 287; see also Scott Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: 
Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 402 (1988). 
 163. See supra notes 15–16, 26, 62–63, 75, 78, 93–94 and accompanying text.  But see cases cited 
supra notes 30–32, 80–81, 135 and accompanying text. 
File: 02 Holley, pg. 39 - v7i1.doc Created on: 12/1/2008 3:16:00 PM Last Printed: 12/23/2008 6:19:00 PM 
2008 CRIMINALIZING SUSPICION 73 
sanctioned by an express constitutional amendment.
164
  Once sanctioned, 
legislatures are free to criminalize any innocuous conduct, or even inno-
cuous omissions, that can be fairly characterized as a lack of cooperation 
by a citizen with any plausibly permissible investigatory technique em-
ployed by the government during this temporary seizure.
165
  Most egre-
giously, racial minorities and the underclass appear to have borne a dispro-
portionate likelihood of being stopped, and eventually criminalized, on the 
basis of only reasonable suspicion of generic criminality.
166
 
Abolition is appropriate, reform is necessary, and existing sound subs-
tantive criminal law principles are the source recommended for such 
reform.  A proposal follows. 
Only evidence that provides at least a 25 percent probability that a spe-
cific person or his cohorts has committed, is in the process of committing, 
or imminently will be committing a specific crime (or traffic violation if 
the stop is of a motorist) should constitute a basis for finding reasonable 
suspicion to justify the government seizing-by-stopping an individual.
167
  
Without this reform, the reality is that in today‘s penal codes there are 
hundreds of crimes, and in addition local legislatures have enacted ordin-
ances with scores of additional crimes.  The government practically has 
carte blanche after a seizure to construct a plausible reasonable suspicion 
claim based on a generic reference to criminality, or to one or more of the 
hundreds of crimes located in current state and local penal codes.
168
  But if 
a specific crime can be the only basis of the reasonable suspicion, element 
identification and evaluation is determinative of the probability that there 
was evidence to justify a one-in-four chance that such a crime had been or 
was in the process of being committed.  This identification and evaluation 
is based on principles sufficiently complex that it should have the effect of 
  
 164. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 38 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Justice Douglas pointed out that 
the arrest and searches practiced by the English based only on suspicion were the very evils the Fourth 
Amendment and the probable cause standard were meant to prevent.  Id. at 37; see also supra notes 15, 
75, 78. 
 163. See supra notes 26, 62–63, 84, 93–94 and accompanying text.  But see cases cited supra notes 
66–67, 7071. 
 166. David A. Harris, Factors For Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and 
Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659 (1994); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black 
Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 1271, 1278 (1998); Tracey Maclin, Race And the 
Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998) (reporting and commenting upon empirical studies 
proving government agents used the reasonable suspicion standard for racist purposes to disproportio-
nately seize African-American motorist). 
 167. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 168. Dannye Holley, Culpability Evaluations in the State Supreme Courts from 1977 to 1999: A 
―Model‖ Assessment, 34 AKRON L. REV. 401, 425 n.7 (2001) (reporting on a national survey of state 
legislative drafting councils).  One of the principal inquiries of this survey was to determine the number 
of crimes currently contained in the states‘ penal codes.  See also Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Crim-
inal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1409 (2001) (examining the role of municipalities 
in legislating against crime). 
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substantially reducing the ability of the government to easily reconstruct 
post hoc ―reasonable suspicion.‖  Another consequence of redefining rea-
sonable suspicion to focus on a specific minimum probability that a specif-
ic person or his cohorts has committed, or is in the process of committing, 
a specific crime is that it would constitutionally ban criminalizing reasona-
ble suspicion of some future commission of even a serious crime.
169
 
The reform of the reasonable suspicion standard would also signal the 
death knell for the current prevalent criminalization of the refusal of sex 
offenders to comply with sex-offender-registration statutes.
170
  As docu-
mented earlier in this article, such crimes are based on mere legislative 
subjective suspicion that the entire universe of sex offenders is likely to 
commit another such crime.
171
  As also documented earlier, the Supreme 
Court has consistently barred criminalization based on the subjective sus-
picion of the government through executive branch agents, including when 
that suspicion is based upon a lack of cooperation of the citizen with the 
government‘s attempt to investigate and interact with the suspect.172  Fur-
thermore, constitutional crimes cannot be created solely to vindicate sub-
jective suspicion even in combination with the moral values of the current 
majority, especially where they take the form of a crime that targets a dis-
tinct group for engaging in or failing to perform certain conduct.
173
 
The proposed specific definition of reasonable suspicion would also 
cast doubt on the policy wisdom of one commentator‘s recommendation to 
focus a finding of reasonable suspicion on a generic, circumstantial ele-
ment subject to post hoc reconstruction: abnormal behavior in the specific 
neighborhood, when that neighborhood is characterized by executive 
branch government agents or agencies as ―high crime.‖174  Such a position 
is tantamount to telling the government to assert, after the fact and based 
on any source or even no source at all, that the accused‘s behavior was 
atypical for the neighborhood.  The appropriate focus is not on atypical 
neighborhood behavior, but on a factual basis to suspect that the accused 
has engaged in, or is engaging in, the ―conduct‖ specified as an element of 
  
 169. See, e.g., In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712, 721 (Wis. 2001) (sanctioning criminalization of reasona-
ble suspicion of the future commission of homicide). 
 170. See supra notes 97100 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra notes 103104 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
 173. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 581–84 (2003) (O‘Connor, J., concurring) (expressly pointing 
out that the Texas sodomy statue, struck down on substantive due process grounds, was more appro-
priately declared unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection, and also noting that those con-
victed of that crime would be required to register as sex offenders in four states). 
 174. Raymond, supra note 15, at 126–27. 
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2. Curbing the Constitutionality of Criminalizing Suspicion—
Identifying why Most Supreme Courts Sanction the Constitutionali-
ty of Criminalizing Suspicion & Reforming the Void-for-Vagueness 
Doctrine by Centering it on Ex Post Facto Policy & Current Subs-
tantive Criminal Law Principles 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine, as it has evolved in the opinions of 
the U.S. Supreme Court and state supreme courts, has always been concep-
tually flawed.
176
  Most obviously, its two policy pillars—one focusing on 
the inability of an accused to discern, prior to engaging in conduct, what is 
criminalized, and the other focusing on the empowerment of law enforce-
ment agents, and ultimately the trier of fact, to arbitrarily, after the fact, 
determine what should be criminalized—are substantively identical with 
respect to what they suggest should be the nature of the appropriate evalua-
tion regarding the minimal content of a constitutional crime definition.
177
  
The appropriate evaluation should embody the principle that converts the 
vagueness doctrine to a means to fully explicate the protection that should 
be provided by the federal and state constitutions‘ ex post facto prohibi-
tions.
178
  No conduct should be criminalized after the fact, and a legislature 
cannot delegate authority it does not have to criminalize after the fact, 
either on purpose or through poor draftsmanship.  Hence, government 
agents, the trial trier of fact, and appellate courts cannot be delegated the 
authority to criminalize after the fact.
179
  The two-pronged inquiry is there-
  
 175. But see supra notes 167–169 and accompanying text (regarding the qualifying discussion). 
 176. Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 335, 358–59 (2005); Ted Sampsell-Jones, Reviving Saucier: Prospective Interpretations of Crim-
inal Laws, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 735–36 (2007). 
 177. See, e.g., Silvar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 P.3d 682, 685 (Nev. 2006) (following Ko-
lender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), and asserting that the second pillar is somehow different and of 
more significance than the first inquiry); State v. Porelle, 822 A.2d 562, 565 (N.H. 2003); People v. 
Stuart, 100 N.Y.2d 412, 42021 (2003) (recognizing that the two standards are ―closely related‖). 
 178. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting Bills of Attainder and ex-post facto laws); id. § 10, cl. 1 
(imposing the same prohibitions on the states); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.05(1) (Official Draft 
1985) (―No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is a crime or violation under this Code or another 
statute of this State.‖). 
 179. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983).  This conceptual view perhaps explains why 
Justice O‘Connor would assert that of the two policy concerns underlying the vagueness doctrines—
notice to potential accused and authorizing post-hoc criminalization by government agents and the trier 
of fact—the latter is more important. 
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fore unnecessary, as conclusively proven by the fact that supreme courts 
almost always find that either both or neither are violated.
180
 
Even when reduced to a single inquiry, however, there is an even more 
fundamental flaw in the current conception of the void for vagueness doc-
trine.  It is quintessentially a doctrine that is highly susceptible to post hoc 
reasoning by the supreme courts, which by definition empowers them, but 
makes the constitutional protection highly ephemeral.
181
  The opportunity 
is provided for these supreme courts to eyeball the words—the clarity of 
which are under scrutiny—in the definition of the crime, make reference to 
the dictionary definition of those words, and proclaim them plain, clear, 
and understandable, therefore denying the claim that the vagueness doc-
trine was violated.
182
  This is especially true because almost universally 
supreme courts place a heavy burden of persuasion on the accused who 
invokes the doctrine to prove that the crime as defined, and as these courts 
have interpreted that definition, violates the doctrine.
183
  Hence the real 
risk—the risk of unconstitutional legislative delegation of ex post facto 
criminalization authority—is seldom mentioned, and the task of standar-
dizing an appropriate policy-based protocol for evaluating that risk is al-
most never undertaken.
184
  This leaves the right embodied in the prohibi-
tion against ex post facto criminalization vulnerable to the first definition 
  
 180. See, e.g., id. at 358 (both violated); Silvar, 129 P.3d at 685–86 (both violated).  But see Porelle, 
822 A.2d at 566 (neither violated).  Even when a state supreme court focuses its analysis on only one of 
the two standards, the facts and outcome of the case graphically illustrate that the finding of a violation 
also demonstrates that the other standard was also violated.  Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 
545 (1971) (per curiam) (holding that the ―Suspicious Person‖ city ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague because it failed to give persons prosecuted under it fair notice of what was ―without visible or 
lawful business‖).  The procedural history of Palmer also indicated that a jury found the accused guilty 
of the offense, he was sentenced by a judge to a jail term, an intermediate court upheld the conviction, 
and the Ohio Supreme Court declined discretionary review because no substantial constitutional ques-
tion was presented.  Id. at 544–45. 
 181. Silvar, 129 P.3d at 686; Porelle, 822 A.2d at 567; In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712, 71718 (Wis. 
2001) (showing that a disorderly conduct crime is constitutional even if it prohibits conduct intertwined 
with specific constitutional protections, as long as it is consistent with the legislature‘s purpose in 
enacting the crime); see also Robinson, supra note 176, at 357–58 (asserting that arguably the void for 
the vagueness doctrine itself is an indefinite concept).  The conclusory nature of doctrine‘s use by state 
supreme courts can be compounded: in Porelle, the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined that an 
anti-stalking crime was not too vague, and then conclusionally dismissed arguably pertinent U.S. Su-
preme Court precedent that supported the defendant‘s constitutional challenge.  822 A.2d at 567. 
 182. See, e.g., Porelle, 822 A.2d at 565–66. 
 183. See, e.g., Silvar, 129 P.3d at 684; Porelle, 822 A.2d at 565. 
 184. See Robinson, supra note 176, at 357, 359.  Twice Professor Robinson comes close to agreeing, 
at least by implication, with this principle.  First he asserted that the purpose of the void for vagueness 
doctrine was to prevent legislative delegation of the power to criminalize to the courts.  Id. at 357.  
Later, he cites to a U.S. Supreme Court decision that suggests to him that the vagueness doctrine serves 
to prevent common law criminalization.  Id. at 360.  The decision, however, struck down a statute 
which sought to authorize criminalization based on common law recognition, but of crimes which were 
not already legislatively defined as crimes.  Hence a clear-cut example of an attempt to delegate ex-post 
facto criminalization authority to courts. 
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of criminalization of suspicion identified in this article—enactment of 
crimes which have as their express or implied purpose the criminalization 
of suspicion.
185
  Reform is needed and proposed in the following para-
graph. 
First, for the reasons just discussed, all substantive and procedural 
components of the current void for vagueness doctrine, including the name, 
should be jettisoned.
186
  To determine if a crime‘s definition violates this 
right, there is a sequential set of core inquiries—fully supported by current 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent—that all legislatures, courts, and lawyers 
should make.  This article has reviewed specific precedent that establishes 
that the government cannot define a crime to criminalize solely thoughts, 
status, standing in public, or First Amendment-protected speech and con-
duct, or a combination thereof.
187
  Therefore, a constitutional crime defini-
tion cannot be based only on the government‘s suspicion that the accused 
has committed, is committing, or will imminently commit some generic or 
even specific crime.  Nor can it consist of only an express reference to sus-
picion and the status of the accused, or the refusal of an accused to obey a 
government agent‘s demand that the accused cease thinking, sitting, stand-
ing, loitering in public, or otherwise engaging in conduct protected by the 
Constitution.
188
  This is true because such definitions of crimes do not even 
hint at conduct that can constitutionally be criminalized, thereby leaving 
the criminalization decision to be made ex post facto by government 
agents, the trier of fact, and ultimately, appellate courts. 
There is a large body of precedent that erroneously sanctions the con-
stitutionality of criminalizing suspicion by allowing legislatures to draft a 
definition of a crime that combines bad thoughts in the form of a culpabili-
ty level—such as ―specific intent‖ with status and/or loitering in public as a 
basis to assert suspicion of criminality.
189
  Such crime definitions create the 
grave risk of ex post facto criminalization based on the collective creative 
skills of government agents to conjure and morph suspicion from these 
constitutionally protected sources.  Similarly, defining a crime to include 
only status or innocuous, pervasive behavior as a basis to assert suspicion 
of criminality, creates the grave risk of legislative delegation of ex post 
facto criminalization authority. 
  
 185. See supra notes 16, 135–37 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra notes 176, 181–82 and accompanying text. 
 187. See supra notes 30–31, 69–74, 113, 123–126, 135–36 and accompanying text; see also 91 C.J.S. 
Vagrancy and Related Offenses § 23. 
 188. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Picayune, 701 So. 2d 1101, 1103 (Miss. 1997) (sanctioning the crimi-
nalization as disorderly conduct regarding the refusal of a business owner to obey a police order to 
return inside his business building because he was standing on his business property with a baseball bat 
when other people were causing a disturbance on that property). 
 189. See supra notes 130–31 and accompanying text. 
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Even if the conduct element of such crimes were not constitutionally 
protected, each conduct category identified in the preceding paragraph fails 
as a logical basis for inferring the conscious intent to commit some unspe-
cified, or more appropriately specific, other crime.  Hence, these legislative 
crime definitions open the door to sanctioning criminalization that is based 
upon only the executive branch‘s suspicion, never articulated before the 
seizure, and which therefore can be created and crafted after the fact.
190
  
Similarly, a substantial risk of delegating ex post facto criminalization au-
thority is also present when the legislature defines a crime to include only 
references to thoughts, status, or constitutionally protected conduct, includ-
ing loitering coupled with a generic reference to ―under circumstances,‖ or 
similar language.  Combining words referencing that which cannot be cri-
minalized with language making reference not to what the accused has 
done or not done, but to generic externalities, is a relatively obvious at-
tempt to authorize criminalizing suspicion by providing the opportunity for 
government agents to construct, after the fact, the necessary specifics of 
such circumstances.
191
  These ―suspicious circumstances‖ crimes almost 
invariably fail to include in their definitions conduct of the accused that 
makes the accused somehow responsible for those circumstances. 
A constitutional crime definition must include specific, non-
constitutionally protected conduct, a possession or omission element, or 
alternatively a generic reference to conduct coupled with a specific result 
element.
192
  This minimum content requirement is clear and any legislative 
draftsperson should be able to comply with this principle.  A failure to 
  
 190. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 60 (Ill. 1997) (examining a statute that 
expressly defers to police judgment).  Courts err in sanctioning constitutionality of loitering with intent 
to beg, but this basic drafting protection could be honored if instead criminalization was based upon the 
actual conduct of begging in public. 
 191. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text (regarding the federal Constitution‘s ban on 
criminalizing suspicion by focusing solely or primarily on status); see also Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 61 
(making reference to several pre-1996 state supreme court decisions in which the courts sanctioned the 
constitutionality of loitering statutes based on generic references to ―under circumstances or in a man-
ner‖); Silvar v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 129 P.3d 682, 686 (Nev. 2006) (relying on an Alaska Su-
preme Court decision stating that the vagueness doctrine was violated when the crime criminalized a 
known prostitute for standing around in public); In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Wis. 2001) (finding 
a person could be convicted of disorderly conduct if he engaged in unreasonably loud speech in a 
public or private place ―under circumstances‖ that tend to cause a disturbance).  The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court sanctioned the constitutionality of this obvious attempt to criminalize based only on suspi-
cion of the risk that some disturbance, undefined both with respect to magnitude or temporal relation to 
the speech of the accused, might take place.  In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d at 72122.  In so doing, the court 
failed to recognize that a generic reference to circumstances is to externalities outside the control of the 
accused, which could include fears and biases of other persons.  The statute did not require that the 
state prove that the accused was aware of or in some way responsible for these unspecified circums-
tances. 
 192. Dannye Holley, The Influence of the Model Penal Code’s Culpability Provisions on State Legis-
latures:  A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 SW. L.J. 
229, 230 n.3 (1997). 
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comply signals an attempt by the legislature to delegate ex post facto cri-
minalization authority—an authority the legislature does not possess.193  
However, a crime which is defined by generically making reference to any 
act or course of conduct and which fails to identify a specific result ele-
ment would also be unconstitutional because it violates this core constitu-
tional principle.
194
  This core principle and these two corollaries are all the 
constitutional scrutiny courts should give the work of a legislature in defin-
ing the elements of a crime, and together are sufficient to prevent gross 
abuse and curtail the most blatant attempts to criminalize based only on 
suspicion.  Of course, once a crime clears these fundamental definitional 
hurdles, it could still be challenged on other constitutional grounds such as 
substantive due process or equal protection.
195
 
The federal and state constitutions‘ ex post facto protections also pro-
hibit increasing criminal punishments after the fact.
196
  Despite this specific 
protection, state supreme courts during the period of this study (1995 
through 2007), rejected claims that legislative criminalization based on 
suspicion violated ex post facto constitutional protection.
197
  The California 
Supreme Court did so in the context of sanctioning a legislative decision 
which twice violated the purpose of ex post facto protection: first, in the 
  
 193. People v. Stuart, 100 N.Y.2d 412, 42122 (2003) (citing the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), as authority to support its assertion that when a 
crime definition fails to include a conduct element, it is void for all purposes).  This acknowledgment 
also signals the lack of necessity of bifurcating vagueness challenges on its facts or as applied.  A crime 
definition found flawed under the revised standard is so defective that it cannot be fairly applied to any 
case, because even if the accused arguably engaged in societal-harmful conduct, with some minimum 
culpability, it was not within the definition of this offense prior to his conduct; and whether it was 
appropriate to criminalize his behavior was in fact only determined after the fact by a court and/or the 
trier of fact. 
 194. Stuart, 100 N.Y.2d at 416418 (discussing the New York legislature‘s 1999 criminalization of 
stalking).  The law defines stalking as: ―intentionally . . . engaging in a course of conduct‖ (no specific 
conduct is specified, and almost all conduct in culpability concept terms is purposeful or knowing) ―for 
no legitimate purpose‖ (a mish mash of pseudo culpability and a circumstantial element not related to 
the specific circumstances surrounding the crime event—this element is highly susceptible to post hoc 
determination) and ―directed at‖ (not further defined) ―a specific person‖ if that conduct was likely to 
―cause reasonable fear of material‖ (not further defined) ―harm‖ (possible emotional state of the victim, 
but not a required result) to the victim.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45 (McKinney 1999).  Alternatively, 
the crime required proof both of a specific conduct and a specific result.  Id.  Hence the first, but not the 
second, basis for committing stalking violates the corollary principle articulated in the text and creates 
a grave risk of delegation of ex post facto criminalization authority.  Yet, the New York Court of Ap-
peals, purporting to apply the amorphous current void for vagueness doctrine, sanctioned the constitu-
tionality of this crime, including the defective definition of the crime.  Stuart, 100 N.Y.2d at 42829. 
 195. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003) (holding that criminalization of consensual, pri-
vate sex between adults of the same sex violated substantive due process); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
U.S. 356, 36768 (1886) (holding that crime enforced against only one race violated equal protection). 
 196. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, cl. 3, 10, cl.1; see also Wright v. Superior Court, 936 P.2d 101, 109–10 
(Cal. 1997) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (stating that the ex post facto clause when applied to states should be 
analyzed ―under the analytical framework set forth‖ in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990)). 
 197. See, e.g., Wright, 936 P.2d at 102. 
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criminalizing of subjective suspicion by making it a misdemeanor to refuse 
to register or re-register as a sex offender, and second, by letting the mis-
demeanor conviction serve as the basis for a recidivist conviction—thereby 
changing the crime‘s punishment grade to a felony.198  The court reasoned 
that because the failure to register continued after the effective date of the 
change in the crime to a felony, the accused could be prosecuted based on 
his post-enactment continuing failure.
199
  The court relied entirely on its 
court-created ―continuing crime‖ doctrine, and failed to cite, analyze, or 
adequately consider the superior authority of the federal or California state 
constitution.
200
  The California Supreme Court‘s reliance on its own doc-
trine—articulated well after the conduct of the accused—as the sole basis 
to sanction the imposition of the additional punishment, violated the prin-
ciple that no entity has the authority to significantly enhance the punish-
ment for a crime after the fact.
201
  In addition, the court also failed to ade-
quately consider that it had interpreted this status offense to be a strict lia-
bility offense.
202
  Hence, the court‘s holding was tantamount to finding 
that, after the accused‘s omission, it had the power to declare a felony 
which doubled the significance of doing nothing.  Further, the state was not 
required to prove that the accused was aware of the risk that he had vi-
olated, or was currently violating, his duty, thus obliterating any meaning-
ful protection of that component of the ex post facto right that prohibits 
after-the-fact penalty enhancements.  In a maturing constitutional democ-
racy, our minimal sense of fair play and reason requires that the constitu-
tional ex post facto protection should be held to prevent this result from 
ever recurring. 
3. The Hiibel Constitutional Quandary: Criminalizing Specific Acts or 
Omissions that Constitute Failure to Cooperate with a Government 
Agent Acting with Arguably Reasonable Suspicion—Substantive 
Due Process Scrutiny of the Minimal Rationality of such Criminali-
zation 
Notwithstanding this article‘s proposal for a reformed, more precise, 
and more stringent reasonable suspicion standard, and the reformed vague-
ness doctrine outlined above, a legislature could still constitutionally cri-
minalize specific refusals to obey permissible government investigation 
tactics that are employed after the government has developed reasonable 
  
 198. Id. at 107. 
 199. Id. at 108. 
 200. Id. at 105. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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suspicion that a person has committed, is in the process of committing, or 
will imminently commit a specific crime.  For example, crimes could result 
from a refusal to comply with a government agent‘s investigatory de-
mands, or from the suspicion that sex offenders are always imminently 
threatening to repeat the same or a similar offense.
203
  A legislature making 
this decision can enhance the likelihood of a supreme court sanctioning the 
criminalization decision by including, as an exception, the otherwise total-
ly superfluous language that the crime does not encompass innocent con-
duct specifically protected by the federal and/or state constitutions.
204
 
Criminalizing the refusal to comply with government demands for co-
operation when the government has, at most, only reasonable suspicion 
should not be constitutional in a mature democracy given the myriad of 
investigatory techniques the government can employ based on such suspi-
cion.  This is most obviously true when the specific uncooperative conduct 
or omissions have no rational or logical value as proof of the specific crime 
that was originally suspected.  Yet most state supreme courts in the six 
years before and after September 11th have agreed with the U.S. Supreme 
Court that it is constitutional to criminalize such lack of cooperation with a 
government agent acting on such suspicion, even if, as previously stated, 
the specific uncooperative conduct or omissions have no rational or logical 
nexus to the specific crime that was originally suspected.
205
 
In 2008 and beyond, the national and state substantive due process 
right should bar criminalization of reasonable suspicion when coupled with 
only a failure to cooperate with government attempts to resolve the suspi-
cion.
206
  Criminalization based on reasonable suspicion, like all criminali-
  
 203. See supra notes 85–105. 
 204. Sale v. City of Charleston, 539 S.E.2d 45859 (W. Va. 2000) (finding the constitutionality of a 
juvenile curfew crime was shielded in part against a void for vagueness attack by the fact that the crime 
has exceptions for First Amendment-protected conduct).  Of course, even if the exception was omitted, 
constitutionally protected conduct could not be criminalized. 
 205. See cases cited supra notes 60–65, 96–98 and accompanying text; see also State v. Porelle, 822 
A.2d 562, 566 (N.H. 2003). 
 206. See supra notes 31, 38, 43 and accompanying text; see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
565 (2003) (stating that protection of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment has a substantive di-
mension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person); Donald L. Beschle, Law-
rence Beyond Gay Rights: Taking the Rationality Requirement for Justifying Criminal Statutes Serious-
ly, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 253–75 (2005); Andrew J. Liese, Note, We Can Do Better: Anti-Homeless 
Ordinances as Violations of State Substantive Due Process Law, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1413, 1436 n.143 
(2006) (asserting that the U.S. Constitution substantive due process standard is deferential to legislative 
judgments in the development and employment of the rational basis test, and also that the test has two 
sequential prongs: the first, evaluating whether the legislation seeks to achieve a legitimate government 
interests, and second, whether the method embodied in the statute is rationally related to that interest).  
Thereafter, identifying case authority supporting theses that state substantive due process constitutional 
doctrines provide potentially more protection against criminalization of status and some other implied 
criminalization of suspicion that on balance unjustly injures the liberty interests of people.  See Liese, 
supra at 1437–43. 
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zation decisions, implicates the most basic of substantive due process prin-
ciples.  It does substantial, and in most instances, irreparable, injury to the 
liberty interests of the accused.
207
  This principle unearths another fatal 
flaw of the majority opinion in Hiibel.
208
  The Court‘s holding was a stark 
admission that the request for identification was neither rationally related 
to the investigation nor proof of probable cause of the alleged assault.  If it 
were, it could plausibly have been incriminating, and the accused therefore 
would have been entitled to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination.  
No person should be criminalized and thereby deprived of his liberty based 
on the current standard parameter of only a 2 percent, or even a 25 percent, 
probability that he has committed some other crime, simply because the 
person refuses to cooperate with a government investigatory technique that 
has no rational or logical relationship to proving guilt of the specific crime 
for which he is suspected. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Fear fuels the sanctioning of the criminalization of suspicion.
209
  The 
more people fear, the more they tolerate government encroachments on 
liberty, including the very serious encroachment that was the focus of this 
study—the criminalization of suspicion.210  The more the people who 
represent the government fear, the more they ask the people to tolerate 
their authority to address their fear in part by criminalizing based only on 
suspicion.
211
  This article has demonstrated the reality of those precepts 
with an added dimension.  Every time the legislature enacts a crime that 
criminalizes based solely or predominantly on suspicion, or on the refusal 
to obey a government investigatory technique authorized only by suspi-
cion, it empowers the executive branch of government.  Every time a su-
preme court sanctions the constitutionality of legislation criminalizing 
based solely or predominantly on suspicion, or sanctions the constitutional-
ity of criminalizing a refusal to obey a government investigatory technique 
authorized only by suspicion, it empowers itself, the legislature, and deri-
  
 207. See Beschle, supra note 206, at 255 (suggesting criminal statutes threaten liberty interests pro-
tected by substantive as well as procedural due process). 
 208. See supra notes 23–33, 45–51, and accompanying text. 
 209. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 59 P.3d 1201, 1210 (Nev. 2002) (Agosti, J., dissenting) 
(expressly characterizing the majority opinion seeking to sanction the criminalization of Hiibel as one 
based on fear). 
 210. As Justice Brandeis noted in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), the framers knew that fear breeds repression. 
 211. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 235–36 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (denouncing 
the majority opinion, stating that even real fear cannot justify criminalization or internment based on 
only suspicion which was in turn based only on racial guilt). 
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vatively the executive branches of government.  This empowerment of all 
three branches of the government, based only on suspicion, comes at the 
direct expense of the obvious liberty interests of the people not to be 
seized, prosecuted, stigmatized, and possibly imprisoned. 
Even more alarming are those state supreme court decisions, during the 
dozen-year period of this study, that empowered primarily only the court 
making the decision by turning the authority world on its head.  One of 
these courts subordinated both a specific constitutional right and related 
legislative intent to the court‘s manipulation of its doctrinal scheme, in 
order to sanction the constitutionality of the criminalization of suspicion.
212
  
Another state supreme court subordinated another express constitutional 
right—free speech—by distorting a U.S. Supreme Court doctrine protect-
ing that right, and empowering itself to criminalize suspicion by deciding 
to employ a ―totality of the circumstances approach,‖ which lent itself to 
case-specific and post hoc criminalization of a verbal threat of future cri-
minality.
213
  In effect, the court gave itself the power to skirt the constitu-
tional ex post facto prohibition barring legislative criminalization after the 
actor‘s conduct.214 
One basic precept of our constitutional democracy should remain as a 
bedrock principle no matter how perilous the times: the government should 
never be empowered to criminalize on the basis of suspicion.  This article 
has proven that the government wields such power today, and that reality is 
what all of us should really fear. 
  
 212. State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570, 57677 (Ohio 1998).  In Cook, the Ohio Constitution had an 
express provision which denied its legislature the power to enact retroactive statutes.  Id. at 576.  The 
court concluded that the intent of the legislature in enacting a sex offender registration crime and apply-
ing it to offenders already convicted was to create a retroactive crime despite the constitutional ban.  Id. 
at 577.  Yet the court resorted to its own doctrines on retroactivity to conclude that by its doctrines the 
crime was not a retroactive statute.  Id. at 577. 
 213. In re A.S., 626 N.W.2d 712, 720 (Wis. 2001) (converting the threshold constitutional require-
ment to criminalize pure speech to the sole requirement). 
 214. Id. 
